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Essays on the Returns to Higher Education
WooRam Park
This dissertation examines social and private returns to higher education, which
have important implications for development and public finance. Despite their im-
portance, reliable empirical evidence on the returns to higher education is scarce
due to the endogeneity in higher education at individual and aggregate levels. This
dissertation exploits quasi-experiments to explore the causal effect of higher edu-
cation on various outcomes.
The first chapter, “Does Human Capital Spillover Beyond Plant Boundaries?:
Evidence from Korea” explores a social return to human capital by examining the
magnitude of human capital externalities on plant productivity. Human capital ex-
ternalities exist if plants in a region with a high level of human capital can produce
more—given similar inputs—than plants in a region with less human capital. This
is difficult to ascertain because human capital levels are endogenous. To address
this issue, this paper exploits an educational reform which exogenously increased
cross-region differences in the supply of college graduates starting in the mid 1980s.
Using annually collected plant level data, I explore the effect of changes in human
capital levels induced by this reform on plant productivity. My results suggest that
externalities are limited. I find a correlation between the level of human capital
and plant productivity which is similar to that observed in the U.S. However, after
using an instrumental variable, the effect of the overall level of human capital on
productivity decreases and becomes statistically insignificant.
The second chapter "The Impact of College Education on Labor Market and
Non-pecuniary Outcomes"(with Hyelim Son) exploits an education reform in Korea—
which discretely increased freshmen enrollment in 1981—to examine the private re-
turns produced by college education. Due to the compulsory school entrance law
in Korea, the cohorts that were born after 1962 were more likely to enter college
in 1981 or after. Thus, the cohorts born after 1962, had a higher chance of having
college education than the cohorts born before. We exploit this idea and adopt a
regression discontinuity design to compare the fraction of individuals with some
college education and the average wage for cohorts born close to 1962. Our result
suggests that college education has a substantial positive effect on labor market
outcomes such as wages and employment. In addition, we find that college educa-
tion affects saving, smoking and transfer behavior.
The third and final chapter of my dissertation, "The Effect of Higher Education
on the Careers of Workers", examines the effect of college education on individuals’
subsequent careers. As documented by recent literature, college graduation plays
a direct role in revealing an individual’s ability to labor market. Thus, the ability
of college graduates is more directly observed than the ability of high school grad-
uates in the labor market. I examine whether this difference in ability revelation
between college and high school graduates has an implication on their career after
they enter the job market. I build a model that yields testable implications regard-
ing the effect of college education on ability revealing activity, given the role of
college education in ability revelation. Using the NLSY79 data, I empirically con-
firm the prediction of the model. In particular, I find that high ability high school
graduates more actively engage in ability revealing activities than high ability col-
lege graduates. Overall, the results coincide with the predictions of the model,
implying that the difference in ability revelation has a large implication on under-
standing different careers of high school and college graduates.
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Whether human capital externalities raise productivity is of interest to economists
and policymakers, because this issue has substantial implications regarding gov-
ernment subsidies for education and economic growth (Lucas, 1988).1 However,
1A substantial body of theoretical literature suggests possible mechanisms behind human capital
externalities. Some papers propose spillovers through personal interactions. This idea at least goes
back to Marshall (1890) and is more recently suggested by Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986). According
to this view, geographical proximity between employees is an important condition for human capital
spillovers, as the exchange of ideas through personal interaction is assumed to be decreasing with
distance. This view on the mechanism of human capital spillovers, has been used to argue for the
importance of cities as engines of economic growth (Jacobs, 1970). More recently, Niehaus (2012)
argues that the increase in education levels will lead to knowledge spillovers by increasing workers’
ability to learn skills from other workers. Alternatively, Acemoglu (1996) proposes that the increase
in human capital could have a positive external effect on productivity without involving technology
when there is a costly search between workers and firms. This type of human capital externality does
not necessarily involve knowledge spillovers.
1
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there is no consensus on the empirical magnitude of human capital externalities. In
particular, there is no agreement on whether they are large enough to help explain
cross-regional differences in growth rates, or to justify subsidies for education.2 For
instance, Rauch (1993) and Moretti (2004a) find positive and sizable human capi-
tal externalities on productivity, whereas Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Rudd
(2000) find little evidence that these externalities are significant in practice.3
In part, these conflicting results may reflect that the literature has struggled to
deal with endogeneity. In particular, reliable evidence on the magnitude of human
capital externalities is scarce due to several empirical challenges. First, the level
of human capital in a given region is usually endogenous since it is likely to be
correlated with unobserved characteristics that affect productivity in the region.
Additionally, changes in human capital levels are in most cases gradual; and thus,
sufficient variation for reliable estimation is hard to find. This matter exacerbates
endogeneity concerns when the literature uses within region variation, since even
a small amount of endogeneity could bias results by a considerable amount.
In this paper, I provide new evidence on the magnitude of human capital ex-
ternalities on plant productivity. That is, I examine whether a given plant’s pro-
ductivity is affected by the human capital level of other plants in nearby locations.
In particular, I closely follow the methodology of Moretti (2004c) but use a new
instrument for human capital levels, one based on arguably exogenous variation
in the supply of college graduates across regions induced by the July 30 Education
2Other types of social return to human capital documented by the literature include, effects on
non-economic outcomes such as citizenship (Dee, 2004; Milligan, Moretti, & Oreopoulos, 2004),
health of one’s children (Currie & Moretti, 2003) and criminal activity (Lochner & Moretti, 2004).
3Several papers document the positive relation between productivity and average years of school-
ing using cross-country data (de la Fuente & Domenech, 2001). However, cross-country evidence is
unlikely to reveal the magnitude of human capital externalities since average levels of human capital




Specifically, in 1980, the Korean government implemented an education reform
that resulted in a large and discrete increase in the number of students entering
college in 1981. Between 1979 and 1981, the number of freshmen increased from
98,000 to 190,000. College-specific increases in freshmen enrollment were mechan-
ically determined based on the enrollment prior to the reform. In particular, for
every college, freshmen enrollment in 1981 was generally proportional to freshmen
enrollment in 1979. Thus, cross-college differences in enrollment increased dis-
cretely as the colleges which had a large freshmen enrollment in 1979 experienced
larger absolute increases in enrollment as a result of the reform. Similarly, regions
with larger initial freshmen enrollment-levels experienced larger increases in en-
rollment. This discrete increase in cross-region variation in college enrollment re-
sulted in an increase in the cross-region variation in the supply of college graduates
starting in the mid 1980s. Due to this fact, there were rapid increases in the pro-
portion of workers with college degrees in each region starting in the mid 1980s,
and there was a sizable variation in the change in this proportion across regions as
well.
I construct an instrumental variable which extracts the portion of the region-
specific change in the level of human capital predicted by this exogenous reform.
That is, I rely on the fact that the reform had a larger impact on regions with higher
initial enrollments. My broad approach is closely related to Moretti (2004a) who
uses the presence of land grant colleges as an instrument for the human capital
level in a given region. However, while Moretti (2004a) uses cross-sectional varia-
tion, I exploit the arguably exogenous increase in college enrollment to instrument
for region-specific increases in the level of human capital. I provide further evi-
dence on the potential exogeneity of this change in human capital by showing that
CHAPTER 1 4
it is positively correlated with the initial freshmen enrollment levels only after the
impact of the reform. This evidence helps to address concerns, for example that
the impact of the reform was correlated with pre-trends, or that the reform sim-
ply amplified developing differences in the trends of human capital levels across
regions.
I implement this idea using the 1982-1996 data from the Mining and Manu-
facturing Survey which is collected by Statistics Korea. The data provide detailed
information on output, labor and capital, and other plant-specific characteristics
such as ownership type, age, industry and location. In particular, by estimating a
production function at the plant level, I examine whether region-specific increases
in the share of college graduates had a positive effect on plant productivity after
controlling for plant-specific inputs and characteristics.
Overall, I find little evidence of human capital spillovers beyond plant boundaries—
after controlling for plants’ own level of human capital, the proportion of workers
who are college graduates in a given region does not have a meaningful effect on
plant productivity. The magnitude of the simple correlation between the regional
level of human capital and plant productivity is similar to that observed using
plant level data in the U.S. In particular, pooled regressions suggest that a one per-
centage point increase in the proportion of workers who are college graduates is
associated with a 0.7 percentage increase in productivity. However, after instru-
menting for the human capital level, the effect decreases and becomes statistically
insignificant. The results from the instrumental variable analysis show that there
is a positive bias in the correlation between the level of human capital and pro-
ductivity. Overall, the findings are consistent with recent work by Huber (2012)
which questions the presence of human capital spillovers beyond establishment
boundaries. In particular, by surveying workers in the R&D complex in England,
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he finds that the workers have limited interactions with the workers outside their
establishment; internal resources are sufficient and preferable for innovation.
To my knowledge mine is one of few papers to examine human capital exter-
nalities using plant level data while addressing the endogeneity of regional human
capital. Previous research on human capital externalities mainly uses wages as an
outcome variable (Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000; Moretti, 2004a; Iranzo & Peri, 2009).4
The idea that if human capital externalities exist, workers in a region with a higher
level of human capital will be more productive and thus they will earn higher
wages, forms the basis for the papers in question. However, as Moretti (2004a)
and Ciccone and Peri (2006) discuss, interpreting the results is complicated due to
the imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. This difficulty
along, with the downward sloping demand for the human capital, could yield a
positive relation between the level of human capital and average wages even in
the absence of externalities. Thus, the literature often fails to provide conclusive
evidence on the magnitude of externalities. Moretti (2004c) is one of few excep-
tions as using plant level output allows results to have a more direct bearing on
the magnitude of human capital externalities. In constrast to my findings in Korea,
Moretti (2004c) finds sizable human capital spillovers beyond plant boundaries in
the manufacturing sector in the U.S.
My paper also contributes to the literature on the subject by examining possi-
ble externalities resulting from college education, which could be different from
externalities from K-12 education (Iranzo & Peri, 2009). Finally, this paper adds to
the literature by exploring the effect of human capital externalities in the context
of a developing country. Particularly, despite the widespread belief regarding the
importance of human capital externalities on plant productivity in the growth of
4Lange and Topel (2006) and Moretti (2004b) provide a good summary of the literature which uses
wage data to document the social returns of education.
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South Korea—e.g. Lucas (1988, 1993)—little is known about their empirical mag-
nitude in South Korea. My results suggest the human capital spillovers beyond
establishment boundaries might not have been a crucial factor in Korea’s growth
during the 1980s and 1990s.
The rest of this paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 intro-
duces the institutional background and Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4
presents the identification strategy. Section 5 presents results and a series of robust-
ness checks. The last section discusses the conclusion.
1.2 Institutional Background
Korea offers a unique institutional setting for this type of study in that the cen-
tral government controls the supply of college graduates by setting the freshmen
quota, or entrance quota, for both private and public colleges.5 The freshmen quota
was strictly enforced during 1970s and 1980s as colleges faced severe penalties for
admitting freshmen beyond the assigned quota, such as the loss of government
funding and a decrease in their quota for the following years.6 Moreover, the gov-
ernment also controlled the number of colleges by granting permission for the es-
tablishment of new institutions. The number of colleges was more or less stable
across regions during the period of interest.7 In short, this setting was quite differ-
ent from countries such as the U.S. in which college enrollment is not set in central-
5The government decided not only the freshmen quota but also the admission guidelines for both
private and public colleges.
6The government allowed only a small number of disadvantaged students to be accepted over
the freshmen quota. Further, the government provided an incentive for colleges to keep the actual
enrollment lower than the freshmen quota. For instance, the government increased the subsidy for
colleges if the actual enrollment for a given college was lower than the freshmen quota set by the
government.
7The government eventually relaxed the regulations for establishing new colleges in 1996.
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ized manner. Because of way that the college enrollment was determined in Korea,
the supply of college education was less likely to be responsive to time-varying
region-specific characteristics.
Until 1980, the government only allowed a gradual increase in the freshmen
quota despite a large increase in the demand for college education in 1970s. As a
result, the number of ‘repeat applicants’, who were forced to apply to colleges for
more than one year to receive higher education, accumulated as the quota was not
sufficient to accommodate all of the students who wanted to enter college.
However, in 1981 the freshmen quota discretely jumped due to an unexpected
education reform announced on July 30, 1980 (Choi, 1996).8 The main purposes of
the reform were: i) to increase the probability that students from disadvantaged
backgrounds would receive college education, and ii) to reduce the number of ‘re-
peat applicants’. The major component of the reform was a discrete increase in the
freshmen quota to accommodate more students.9 Figure 1.1 describes the reform’s
mandated increase in the freshmen quota and corresponding increase in the fresh-
men enrollment in 1981. It is clear that this large increase was a onetime event, as
the freshmen quota was stable during the 1980s after the initial increase in 1981.
Importantly, the central government forced each and every college to increase
the freshmen quota in essentially the same way. That is, the magnitude of increase
was not endogenously adapted to each college to accommodate region-specific de-
mand for higher education. In particular, the implementation of the increase in
the freshmen quota was more or less mechanical—in general, the government set
8President Park Chung-hee, who was in office for over 15 years, was assassinated by his body
guard on October 26, 1979. After the assassination, the military junta lead by General Chun Doo-
hwan, gained control after a series of coups. Many people hoped a democratic government would
be established after the assassination, and, as a result, this military junta was not popular. To gain
popularity, the junta announced the education reform on July 30, 1980.
9Other components include prohibiting private tutoring, and abolishing college-specific entrance
exams.
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the freshmen quota in 1981 for each college proportionally to the freshmen quota
of previous years. Thus, the colleges which happened to have a large freshmen
quota in 1979 experienced larger absolute increases by 1981. Figure 1.2 plots the
freshmen quota for each college in 1979 and 1981 along with a 45 degree line. This
figure shows that the relation between the freshmen quota in 1981 and in 1979 is
linear, suggesting that the freshmen quota in 1979 primarily determined the in-
crease. The figure also shows that the absolute differences in enrollment increase,
the gap between the 45 degree line and the freshmen quota in 1981, increase as the
initial freshmen quota increases.
Since the reform was consistently applied to each college, the relationship be-
tween the freshmen quota in 1979 and in 1981 in each region is similar. Figure 1.3
describes the correlation between the freshmen quota in 1979 and in 1981 in each
region along with the 45 degree line. By comparing the freshmen quota in 1981
with the 45 degree line, one can see that regions which happened to have higher
freshmen enrollment in 1979 experienced larger absolute increases by 1981. Thus,
the reform exogenously increased the difference in the supply of college gradu-
ates in each region after the mid-1980s. Furthermore, this figure confirms that the
freshmen quota in 1981 in each region was indeed mostly determined by the pro-
portional increase in the freshmen quota in 1979—the relation between the quotas
in 1979 and in 1981 is linear. The figure thus provides evidence against the claim
that the increase in the freshmen quota in 1981 was endogenously determined by
the government. In fact, Chun Doo-Hwan, the head of the military junta, did not
favor his hometown regions—Gyeongbuk and Daegu—by increasing their quotas
more than in other regions.
As a result of these changes in the supply of college slots across regions, there
is a substantial cross-regional variation in the change in the proportion of the la-
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bor force composed of college graduates. To see this variation, suppose that there
are two regions: A and B where each region has 1000 people entering the work-
force each year. Assume that the initial freshmen enrollments—which could be
endogenous—in region A and region B are 200 and 100, respectively. If there is
no inter-regional mobility, in the long run the proportion of college graduates in
the workforce in region A and region B would be 0.2 and 0.1, respectively.10 Now,
suppose that the government imposed a reform that forces each college to increase
its enrollment by 100%. Then, the college enrollment in region A and region B will
increase to 400 and 200, respectively. As a result of the reform the proportion of
college graduates in the workforce in each region will increase to 0.4 and 0.2. This
example demonstrates that the region with a larger freshmen quota would have
experienced a larger increase in the share of workers with college degrees due to
the reform.
The usefulness of the reform as a quasi-experiment, therefore, depends on whether
the changes in human capital levels across regions were indeed induced by the re-
form. I provide additional evidence on this issue by showing that the trend in the
share of college graduates in each region is positively correlated with the fresh-
men quota—which determined the size of the impact of the reform—only after the
reform. Since the reform increased the existing difference in the freshmen quota
across regions discretely, the regions with a relatively large freshmen quota are ex-
pected to experience a larger increase in the supply of college graduates, and thus a
larger increase in share of workers who are college graduates.11 If the change in the
level of human capital was truly the result of the reform, the proportion of college
graduates among workers in the regions which had a larger number of freshmen
10The analysis assumes 100% graduation rates.
11As a result of the mandatory military service in Korea which usually last 2-3 years, students who
entered college in 1981 entered the job market between 1986 and 1988.
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in 1979 should have increased more than in other regions only after the mid-1980s.
Otherwise, the variation in the increase in the share of college graduates could sim-
ply reflect unobserved underlying trends and/or region-specific shocks.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the correlation between the size of the initial freshmen
quota—measured by the freshmen quota in 1979 divided by the number of total
employees in each region—and the trend in the proportion of college graduates
prior to the reform, which is measured by the change in proportion of white-collar
workers between 1982 and 1986. There is little correlation between the pre-trend
and the size of the freshmen quota in 1979—the correlation is 0.008. This correla-
tion implies that the regions which had a larger freshmen quota in 1979 did not
experience larger increases in human capital prior to the impact of the reform, that
is, prior to the exogenous increase in the supply of college graduates induced by
the reform.
Figure 1.5 describes the correlation between the size of the initial freshmen
quota and the change in the level of human capital after the mid 1980s—measured
by the change in the proportion of the college educated labor force between 1988
and 1992. The figure confirms that higher initial freshmen quotas are correlated
with a greater increase in the proportion of workers with college degrees after the
reform—the correlation is 0.6118. Moreover, figures 1.4 and 1.5 confirm large cross-
region variation in the change of the share of college graduates after the mid 1980s.
The change in share of college graduates among workers prior to the reform in
each region—described in y-axis of Figure 1.4—varies from -0.002 to 0.033 with the
standard deviation 0.0096. The change in the share of college graduates after the
impact, however, varies from 0.034 to 0.0963 with the standard deviation equal to
0.017.
Overall, these findings support the argument that the change in the proportion
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of college graduates across regions was driven by the education reform, and that
the variation in the impact of the policy across regions was driven by the predeter-
mined characteristics of each region.
1.3 Data
To examine human capital externalities on plant productivity, I use the Mining and
Manufacturing Survey provided by Statistics Korea. Statistics Korea has been col-
lecting these data since 1968, but the micro data are only available starting in 1982.
Also, since the manufacturing sector of Korea was heavily affected by the Asian fi-
nancial crisis in 1997, I only use data prior to 1997. These data have been collected
annually from mining and manufacturing plants which have five or more workers.
The survey contains detailed information about individual plants such as indus-
try classification, output, production cost, location, and tangible assets including
capital. The data also contain information on the total number of employees and
the number of white-collar (non-production) employees. However, like most plant
level data, there is no information on the educational attainment level of workers.
Thus, I proxy the change in the proportion of college graduates by the change in
the proportion of white-collar workers.
To explore the validity of this proxy, I use the Basic Wage Structure Survey.
These data have been collected by the Ministry of Employment and Labor of Korea
and are designed to represents the wages of workers in establishments which hire
more than 10 employees. The survey collects data from individual workers from
a sample of establishments representing each sector. The data contain information
on wages, education, occupation and industry.12 Using these data, I show that the
12Unfortunately, the data do not have location identifier for the establishment, thus I cannot use
these data for the main analysis.
CHAPTER 1 12
trend of the proportion of workers with college degrees coincides with the trend
of proportion of white-collar workers. Also, I provide evidence that the increase in
the proportion of college graduates actually induced the increase in the proportion
of white-collar workers.
Figure 1.6 displays the share of college graduates and white-collar among work-
ers in the manufacturing sector using the Basic Wage Structure Survey and Min-
ing and Manufacturing Survey. The time trend for white-collar workers tracks
the trend of college graduates closely; both trends shows little increase until the
mid-1980s and then start rising steeply after 1987. I provide an additional justifi-
cation for using white-collar workers as a proxy for workers with college degrees
by separately plotting the proportion of college graduates and white collar work-
ers for a young cohort—workers aged between 25 and 29—and an older cohort
aged between 40 and 44. Since the policy increased the supply of college graduates
beginning in the mid-1980s, one expects the increase in the proportion of college
graduates only among the young cohorts—only the cohort affected by the policy
would experience the increase in the proportion of workers with a college educa-
tion. Thus, if the proportion of white-collar workers is indeed a good proxy for the
proportion of workers with college degrees, the proportion of white-collar work-
ers should increase only among young cohorts starting in the mid-1980s. Figure
1.7 illustrates the share of college graduates and white-collar among workers sepa-
rately for the younger and older cohorts of workers. The information in this figure
confirms the prediction, as proportions of both college graduates and white-collar
workers among the young cohorts increase rapidly after mid 1980 whereas both
proportions among the older cohorts shows little if any change during the 1980s
until the early 1990s. This information implies that, during this period, the increase
in the proportion of white-collar workers was driven by the increased availability
CHAPTER 1 13
of college graduates.
Finally, Figure 1.8 provides the time trend for the proportion of workers who
have a high school diploma as their highest degree. The figure shows a consid-
erable increase in the share of workers with high school education prior to the
mid-1980s. Thus, one can verify that the trend of white-collar workers does not
coincide with the trend of the high school graduates. Overall, the evidence shows
that the increase in workers with college degrees caused the increase in the propor-
tion of non-production workers in this period. Thus, hereafter I use the changes
in the proportion of white-collar worker as a proxy for the proportion of college
graduates without further distinction.
In my main analysis, in order to compare my study with previous work using
plant level data, I focus on the manufacturing sector. Additionally, I omit years
when the Mining and Manufacturing Survey was conducted as part of the Indus-
trial Census—1983, 1988 and 1993—since variable definitions and the samples in
those years are not consistent with other years.
Table 1 provides summary statistics. The first two columns contain the mean
and the standard deviation during the period prior to the impact of the reform
and columns (3) and (4) describe the mean and the standard deviation of the vari-
ables after the impact of the reform. All monetary values are in 1990 Korean Won.
One can verify that both the value of the output and the value-added of indi-
vidual plants increased rapidly during this period. The average output increased
about 50 percent between the two periods from a base of 2.5 billion Won (1USD is
about 1,000 Won). The average value added of each plant also increased by a large
amount: about 100 percent.13 Moreover, the average capital stock also increased
rapidly during the period of interest. The average capital stock of each plant was
13The value added of each plant is defined as the value of output less the cost of production which
includes cost of materials and electricity.
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around 723 million Won during the years 1982-1986, whereas it was about 1.4 bil-
lion Won during the years 1987-1996.
More importantly, the average proportion of white-collar workers increased by
a considerable amount. In particular, the average proportion of white-collar work-
ers within a plant increased by around 25 percent, or about five percentage points,
after the reform went into effect. Moreover, the increase in the proportion white-
collar workers did not differ significantly across differently sized plants. The pro-
portion of white-collar workers was about 20 percent prior to the impact of the
reform for all plant sizes, and about 25 percent after 1987, regardless of plant size.
Consistent with the increase in the proportion of white-collar workers in individ-
ual plant, the average proportion of white-collar workers in a given region also
increased by a similar amount after the mid-1980s. The average payment to work-
ers increased during this period as the total payment to workers increased by a
substantial amount despite the decrease in the number of employees. The average
age of an individual plant and the building area used by each plant were both sta-
ble during the years 1982-1996. Overall, the summary statistics show that many
plant level characteristics—with a few exceptions—significantly changed with the
policy.
1.4 Research Design and Empirical Specification
In this section, I provide detailed information on how I use this annually collected
data to examine human capital spillovers beyond plant boundaries.
The existence of human capital externalities implies that plants located in re-
gions with higher levels of human capital will be more productive. Thus, one can
assess the magnitude of such externalities by examining the relation between the
level of human capital and plant productivity in each region. However, empirically
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estimating externalities is challenging because the change in the level of human
capital is endogenous in most cases. That is, unobserved factors affecting regional
plant productivity can also have a positive effect on the overall level of human cap-
ital. For instance, the establishment of a “million dollar plant” can have a positive
effect on the productivity of existing plants and also attract workers with higher
human capital (Greenstone, Hornbeck, & Moretti, 2010). In this case, a positive re-
lation between the level of human capital in a given region and its average plant
productivity could exist even in the absence of human capital externalities. In other
words, a positive correlation between the level of human capital and average plant
productivity does not necessarily imply the existence of human capital externali-
ties.
In the remainder of this section, I describe the endogeneity issue in detail using
an empirical strategy adopted from Moretti (2004c). I also explain how the empiri-
cal setting in this paper helps mitigate some associated concerns.
I assume a Cobb-Douglas production function;
Yijrt = AijrtBijrtαbWijrtαwKijrtβ (1.1)
where Yijrt is output of the plant i, in industry j, in region r, at year t. Bijrt, Wijrt
and Kijrt denote inputs: blue-collar workers, white collar-workers, and capital, re-
spectively. Total factor productivity is represented by Aijrt. If plant productivity
depends on the regional level of human capital, then, ln Aijrt can be expressed as
follows:
ln Aijrt = γHrt + ej + er + et + ert + eijrt (1.2)
where Hrt is the proportion of workers who are college graduates, which measures
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the level of human capital in a given region. The coefficient of Hrt, γ, indicates
the effect of regional human capital on productivity. Thus, the magnitude of hu-
man capital externalities on total factor productivity will depend on the size and
significance of γ.
After taking logs of the production function (1.1) and substituting for ln Aijct,
(1.1) can be rewritten as;
yijrt = γHrt + αbbijrt + αwwijrt + βkijrt + X′ijrtΦ+ dj + dr + dt + ert + eijrt (1.3)
where yijrt is log of the value added of the plant. bijrt and wijrt are the log of labor
input of white-collar and blue-collar workers, respectively. kijrt denotes the log
capital stock. One advantage of using repeated cross section data is that one can
control for year and region fixed effects.14 dj, dr and dt are industry fixed effects,
region fixed effects, and year fixed effects, respectively. In addition to fixed effects, I
also control for the basic characteristics of plant i, Xijrt, such as age of plant, the type
of ownership and area of the plant’s building, which can affect the productivity of
the plant.
The main source of endogeneity arises if time-varying region-specific shocks,
ert, are positively correlated with the change in the share of college graduates, Hrt.
Moreover, since the change in the level of human capital is gradual in most cases,
the endogeneity issue can be exacerbated by controlling for region fixed effects. In
other words, since there will be only a small amount of variation left in Hrt after
controlling for region fixed effects, even a small correlation between Hrt and ert
could bias estimates by a large amount.
As stated, I address these challenges by using the policy change that induced a
14The survey does contain the plant id. Unfortunately, the id is not assigned consistently across
the year, thus one cannot control for the plant fixed effects.
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sharp increase in the supply of college graduates starting in the mid-1980s (see Sec-
tion 2). This raises the probability that there will be a sufficient amount of within
region variation in the level of human capital to estimate γ reliably. In other words,
even after controlling for region fixed effects, the variation left in Hrt should be
sufficient to estimate γ. Furthermore, there is a sizable amount of variation in the
increase in the proportion of workers who are college graduates across regions.
Importantly, since this cross-regional variation was arguably induced by the ex-
ogenous reform, the variation in Hrt during this period is unlikely to be correlated
with the region-specific time shock ert. Moreover, since the magnitude of impact
of the reform was largely determined by the predetermined characteristics of each
region—freshmen quota in 1979—controlling for region fixed effects will help ad-
dress the endogeneity in the change in level of human capital.15
However, Figure 1.5 also provides some evidence of the endogenous sorting of
human capital, as there are regions which experienced distinctly smaller increases
in human capital compared to the size of their initial freshmen quota. These re-
gions include Jeonbuk and Jeonnam, which rose up against the military junta, and
as a result their development was impeded during the 1980s. Another region is
Gangwon, where the economy heavily depended on coal mining; the demand for
coal fell sharply and the region declined rapidly during the period. Since the de-
viation in the increase in the level of human capital from the share of the freshmen
quota is non-random, the result from longitudinal specification which controls for
the region fixed effects would still be biased.
Thus, to further address this concern, I instrument the change in the proportion
15One shortcoming from using the discrete increase in the supply of college graduates is that the
quality of white-collar workers might have decreased due to the policy. In particular, the average
quality of white-collar workers might have decreased more in the regions which experienced a larger
increase of white-collar workers. If this is the case, the effect of the proportion of white-collar worker
on productivity would underestimate the effect of regional human capital on productivity.
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of college graduates by exploiting the exogenous timing and the size of the positive
supply shock in college graduates induced by the reform. My approach is to use
only the change in the level of human capital predicted by the exogenous education
reform. In particular, I instrument the change in the level of human capital using
the freshmen quota prior to the reform, which determined the size of the impact,
interacted with a dummy variable indicating the post-period. Formally, the first
stage is as follows;
Hrt = POST∗PropFresh79rt+ θbbijrt+ θwwijrt+ κkijrt+X′ijrtΠ+ dj+ dr+ dt+ ert+ eijrt
(1.4)
where Hrt is proportion of the college graduates and the POST is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one after 1986. The relative size of the freshmen quota in 1979,





where f q1979r indicates the freshmen quota in 1979 in each region and the emprt is
the total number of employees in the region, r at time t.
The second stage of the IV regression uses the predicted value of the proportion
of college graduates from the first stage , Hˆrt, and estimates the following equation.
yijrt = γHˆrt + αbbijrt + αwwijrt + βkijrt + X′ijrtΦ+ dj + dr + dt + ert + eijrt (1.6)
Again, the coefficient of interest is γ. Ideally, Hˆrt is a function of variables that are
not correlated with ert and γ will not suffer from endogeneity bias and thus will
address the bias associated with OLS estimates.
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1.5 Results
In this section I provide the estimation results. I begin by documenting results
from a ‘pooled regression’ specification which omits the region fixed effects from
equation (1.3). Thus, the results from this specification describe the correlation
between the proportion of college graduates among workers in a given region and
plant productivity.
Table 2 documents the pooled regression results for various specifications. All
specifications control for the capital stock, labor input by the type of worker and
year fixed effects. Moreover, to control for time-varying region-specific produc-
tivity shocks, I also control for the log of capital stock per worker in each region.
Labor inputs are measured by the number of employees, and the capital stock is
measured as the monetary value of assets excluding the value of land. Columns
(2)-(4) control for additional characteristics of plants, such as age, type of owner-
ship, and industry at the 2 digit level. Column (3) also controls for year × industry
dummies, and Column (4) allows the technology to differ across industries by al-
lowing the coefficients of labor inputs and the capital stock to vary across industries
defined at the 2 digit level. The results exhibit a positive correlation between the
level of human capital and plant productivity; this coincides with cross-sectional
results in the U.S. as documented by Rauch (1993) and Moretti (2004c). The coef-
ficient is consistently sizable and statistically significant across specifications. In
particular, a percentage point increase in the proportion of white-collar workers in
a given region—which is used as a proxy for the share of college graduates—is as-
sociated with a 0.75 percent increase in plant productivity. Although the definition
of the variables is not exactly the same as in Moretti (2004c), the magnitude of the
correlation between the share of workers with a college degree and plant produc-
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tivity is similar.16 Overall, the results from Table 2 show that a positive correlation
between plant productivity and level of human capital exist in Korea. In the re-
mainder of this section, I show that the magnitude of the coefficient decreases as I
further address the endogeneity by exploring the implementation of the reform.
Table 3 reports on a longitudinal specification which controls for region-specific
dummies as well as year fixed effects. Again, all specifications control for the labor
input of each type of worker, capital stock, area of the building used by plants,
and the log of capital stock per worker in each region. The additional controls and
specifications used in each column are the same as in Table 2. Since the change in
the proportion of college graduates in this period is mostly caused by the reform,
the region fixed effects will address a substantial portion of the endogeneity in the
change in proportion of college graduates.
As expected, the magnitude of the main coefficient decreases, compared to the
baseline pooled regression result. The size of the coefficients vary from 0.3 to 0.4
which is about half the magnitude of the simple correlation between the level of hu-
man capital and productivity. However, the point estimate of the main coefficient
in columns (1) and (2) is still somewhat sizable and statistically different from zero.
Since this specification cannot completely rule out endogeneity, I further address
the issue by using my instrumental variable.
Table 4 conveys the result for the IV regression and the corresponding reduced
form result. Columns (1) and (2) report the first stage, and Columns (3) and (4)
report the second stage. Additionally, Columns (2) and (4) control for the individ-
ual characteristics of plants. The first stage of both specifications is strong as the
coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant at 1%. Moreover the
F-statistics of the first stage regression are sufficiently larger than 10 for both spec-
16In Moretti (2004c), the cross sectional estimate of the correlation between the share of the college
graduate workers and the productivity of plants varies from 0.807 to 0.847.
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ifications. The results from the second stage provide further evidence against the
existence of human capital spillovers as the magnitude of the main coefficient is
smaller than that of the specification in the previous section. The magnitude of the
coefficient from the preferred specification is close to zero, 0.08, and statistically
indistinguishable from zero. In particular, the size of the coefficient is approxi-
mately one-seventh of the estimate from Moretti (2004c). That said, although the
point estimate is significantly smaller, 95 percent confidence interval of the coeffi-
cient does not exclude the estimate from Moretti (2004c). In addition to the 2SLS
result, Columns (5) and (6) report the reduced form result. Consistent with the
2SLS result, the coefficient on the POST ∗ PropFresh79rt is close to zero and statis-
tically insignificant. Instrumenting the proportion of the college graduates further
addresses endogeneity and further corrects the bias in the coefficient of interest.
Moreover, the decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient compared to the longi-
tudinal estimate seems plausible, as the longitudinal estimate is most likely to be
positively biased. Thus, the instrumental variable analysis of this paper provides
more compelling estimates.
In short, despite finding a sizable correlation, the effect of the human capital
level on productivity decreases and become statistically insignificant as I apply my
instrumental variable which properly corrects the positive bias. Thus, the results
provide little support for the existence of human capital spillovers beyond plant
boundaries.
In remainder of this section, I perform several robustness checks.
1.5.1 Robustness Check
As a robustness check, I omit intermediate years when the impact of the reform
was not fully realized and thus focus on the long term effects of the policy. In
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particular, I exclude the years between 1986 and 1993 when the proportion of col-
lege graduates in the labor force was increasing steeply as young college graduates
were replacing low skilled workers.
Table 5 describes the result from pooled regression which omits region fixed
effects and the longitudinal estimate which includes region fixed effects. As ex-
pected, the size of the coefficient becomes larger than that in the specification which
included the intermediate years. However, as described in Table 6, the estimated
effect of human capital on productivity decreases by a large amount and becomes
statistically indistinguishable from zero after I use the IV analysis.
Lastly, I use a more general form for the production function—a translog specification—
instead of the Cobb-Douglas specification and estimate (1.3) including the square
of each log input and the interaction between each log input. Table 7 reports the
results under this production function. The magnitude of the coefficient from this
specification is slightly different from the one obtained under the Cobb-Douglas
specification. Consistent with the analysis using Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion, the results from Table 7 shows the sizable and significant correlation between
the level of human capital and plant productivity.
Table 8 reports the results of the instrumental variable analysis under the translog
production function. The coefficient of interest is somewhat sizable compared to
the main specification, however, it is not statistically different from zero. More-
over, the point estimate of local human capital spillover is approximately half of
that of translog specification in Moretti (2004c), although I cannot completely rule
out the moderate effect of regional human capital level on productivity due to the
large standard errors. Thus, this analysis shows that the main results are robust in
regards to changes in the functional form of production function.
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1.5.2 Internal Validity of the Reform
Although the variation of impact across regions induced by this reform was large
and was exogenously imposed, one might worry about the internal validity of this
policy. In particular, it is debatable whether the workers who became college grad-
uates due to this reform are comparable in terms of human capital with college
graduates who entered college prior to the education reform. In other words, if the
reform simply increased the number of college graduates without adding any hu-
man capital, then one would not expect externalities from the increased proportion
of college graduates.
To address this concern, I show that there were plant level responses to the
increase in the share of college graduates. First, there was an increase in the pro-
portion of white-collar workers, which I show closely mirrors the increase in the
proportion of college graduates. If the workers who earned a college degree due
to the increased freshmen quota had no additional human capital relative to high
school graduates, there would be no reason for plants to hire them as white-collar
workers. Moreover, the trend for the average capital per worker coincides with
the increase in the proportion of college graduates. Figure 1.9 shows the average
capital per worker in the manufacturing sector during the period of interest.17 Its
trend closely follows the trend of the share of college graduates. This suggests that
plants increased their investment in response to the increase in the share of college
graduates.
Finally, I examine the wages by cohorts to see whether the increase in college
education led to an increase in the overall level of human capital. In particular, due
to the compulsory school entrance law in Korea, the cohorts that were born after
1962 were more likely to enter college in 1981 or later. Thus, the cohorts born after
17The monetary values are adjusted to the 1990 Korean Won.
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1962 would have a higher chance of earning a college education than the cohorts
born prior to 1961. Park and Son (2012) exploit this idea by adopting a regression
discontinuity design and by comparing the share of individuals with some college
education and the average wage by cohorts born around 1962. The authors docu-
ment a discrete jump in the share of college graduates and a corresponding jump
in income and wages for the cohort born in 1962. Figures 1.10 and 1.11 describe the
proportion of college graduates among workers and age-adjusted average monthly
wage, respectively. In each case the x-axis denotes birth year centered at 1961. The
figures verify the discrete increase in both the level of education and wages, where
the latter is a proxy of human capital, for cohorts born after 1962. Overall, the ev-
idence shows that college education after the policy had sizable value added in
terms of human capital; and thus, the increased proportion of college graduates
due to the policy is valid for analyzing human capital externalities.
1.6 Conclusion and Discussion
The magnitude of the return to human capital has important policy implications,
for example, on the appropriate level of government subsidies to education. Thus,
there is a large body of literature documenting the private benefit from human
capital accumulation on the various aspects of life—including wage, health and
happiness (Card, 1999; Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009). However, social returns to
human capital, despite their important implications on growth and public finance,
have been documented to a lesser degree.
To address this partial gap in the literature, this paper the examines magnitude
of human capital externalities on productivity using plant level data. In particular,
it tests whether plants located in regions with higher levels of human capital can
produce more with a similar amount of input. To address this issue, I explore the
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education reform in Korea, which exogenously changed the level of human capital
across regions by increasing existing differences in the supply of college graduates
starting in mid-1980s.
Using this exogenous change, I empirically estimate the relation between the
regional level of human capital and plant productivity. In particular, I explicitly
control for the endogeneity in the change in the level of human capital by using
an instrumental variable that extracts the portion of the change in human capital
induced by this reform. Overall, I find little evidence of human capital spillovers
beyond plant boundaries. That is, the productivity of a given plant in a given re-
gion is not affected by the level of human capital outside that plant after controlling
for the plant’s own human capital and other characteristics.
The results of this paper coincide with the recent literature that questions the
plausibility of human capital spillovers beyond plant boundaries. In particular, it
is not clear why skilled workers would teach their skills to less skilled workers
working in other establishments. That is, even if the workers interacted with the
workers in other plants, human capital spillovers beyond plant boundaries are un-
likely to occur, since skilled workers have little incentive to pass along their skills
without being compensated. Given the lack of convincing literature on a mecha-
nism for human capital outside of plant affecting productivity, the results of this
paper are not surprising.18
18It is important to note that this paper does not provides evidence that contradicts all types of
human capital spillovers. For instance, human capital spillovers inside the plant or peer effects where
workers are more likely to interact could still exist (Mas & Moretti, 2009).
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
1982-1986 1987-1996
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
total output (*1,000,000) 2519.0 30465.4 3844.2 52455.7
value added(*1,000,000) 874.8 9139.7 1596.8 23646.4
share of white-collar in region 0.198 0.038 0.270 0.049
share of white-collar in plant 0.206 0.139 0.251 0.152
employee <25 0.216 0.131 0.250 0.143
employee >25 and <50 0.198 0.144 0.250 0.164
employee>50 0.200 0.148 0.267 0.170
number of white-collar 14.4 88.9 12.6 94.0
number of blue-collar 59.3 292.6 35.8 208.7
capital (*1,000,000) 723.1 11989.0 1423.2 25697.5
average payment(*1,000,000) 2.685 1.159 7.162 3.593
area of building (m2) 2084.8 17170.5 2275.2 25142.2
age of plants 8.005 7.152 8.155 8.246
number of obs 121573 447807
Note : Monetary values are in 1990 Korean Won. 1 US dollar is approximately 1,000 Won
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Table 1.2: Correlation between regional human capital levels and plant
productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
share of white-collar in region 0.724*** 0.749*** 0.769*** 0.728***
(0.099) (0.081) (0.078) (0.083)
Additional Controls y y y
Industry * Year effects y
Technology vary by Industry y
adj. R-sq 0.809 0.815 0.816 0.819
N 569380 569380 569380 569380
All specification includes log number of white-collar and blue-collar workers, log of
capital stock and year fixed effects. Specification (2),(3) and (4) additionally controls
for individual plant specific characteristics such as industry and age of plants. The
standard errors are clustered at region-year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 1.3: Effect of regional human capital level on productivity – Lon-
gitudinal Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
share of white-collar in region 0.456** 0.441** 0.331* 0.436**
(0.221) (0.210) (0.179) (0.208)
Additional Controls y y y
Industry * Year effects y
Technology vary by Industry y
adj. R-sq 0.809 0.816 0.816 0.819
N 569380 569380 569380 569380
All specification includes log number of white-collar and blue-collar workers, log
of capital stock, year fixed effects and region fixed effects. Specification (2),(3)
and (4) additionally controls for individual plant specific characteristics such as
industry and age of plants. The standard errors are clustered at region-year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 1.4: Effect of regional human capital level on productivity – IV analysis
first stage IV reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
after1987*freshmen quota79 0.264*** 0.263*** 0.062 0.023
(0.040) (0.040) (0.117) (0.112)
share of white-collar in region 0.235 0.087
(0.426) (0.419)
Additional Controls y y y
First stage F 43.47 43.48
adj. R-sq 0.978 0.978 0.809 0.816 0.809 0.816
N 569380 569380 569380 569380 569380 569380
All specification includes log number of white-collar and blue-collar workers, log of capital stock, year fixed
effects and region fixed effects. Specification (2), (4) and (6) additionally controls for individual plant specific
characteristics such as industry and age of plants. The standard errors are clustered at region-year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 1.5: Robustness Check – Excluding intermediate years(pooled regres-
sion and longitudinal estimate)
Pooled Regression Longitudinal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
share of white-collar in region 0.751*** 0.748*** 0.675** 0.567**
(0.137) (0.1132) (0.280) (0.254)
Year Fixed Effects y y y y
Region Fixed Effects y y
Additional Controls y y
adj. R-sq 0.816 0.822 0.817 0.823
N 280021 280021 280021 280021
All specification includes log number of white-collar and blue-collar workers, log of
capital stock. Specification (2) and (4) additionally controls for individual plant specific
characteristics such as industry and age of plants. The standard errors are clustered at
region-year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 1.6: Robustness Check – Excluding intermediate years(IV analysis)
first stage IV reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
after1987*freshmen quota79 0.289*** 0.263*** 0.077 0.055
(0.044) (0.040) (0.146) (0.126)
share of white-collar in region 0.268 0.192
(0.485) (0.428)
Additional Controls y y y
First stage F 41.71 41.66
adj. R-sq 0.979 0.980 0.817 0.822 0.817 0.822
N 280021 280021 280021 280021 280021 280021
All specification includes log number of white-collar and blue-collar workers, log of capital stock, year
fixed effects and region fixed effects. Specification (2), (4) and (6) additionally controls for individual
plant specific characteristics such as industry and age of plants. The standard errors are clustered at
region-year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 1.7: Robustness Check – Translog production function(pooled regres-
sion and longitudinal estimate)
Pooled Regression Longitudinal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
share of white-collar in region 0.635*** 0.692*** 0.367* 0.397**
(0.101) (0.081) (0.209) (0.194)
Year Fixed Effects y y y y
Region Fixed Effects y y
Additional Controls y y
adj. R-sq 0.816 0.822 0.815 0.821
N 569380 569380 569380 569380
All specification includes log number of white-collar and blue-collar workers, log of
capital stock, square term of each log input and interactions between the log input.
Specification (2) and (4) additionally controls for individual plant specific characteris-
tics such as industry and age of plants. The standard errors are clustered at region-year
level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 1.8: Robustness Check – Translog production function(IV analysis)
first stage IV reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
after1987*freshmen quota79 0.263*** 0.262*** 0.079 0.068
(0.040) (0.040) (0.104) (.099)
share of white-collar in region 0.302 0.259
(0.383) (0.419)
Additional Controls y y y
First stage F 43.12 43.12
adj. R-sq 0.978 0.978 0.815 0.821 0.815 0.821
N 569380 569380 569380 569380 569380 569380
In addition to year and region fixed effects, all specification includes log number of white-collar and
blue-collar workers, log of capital stock, square term of each log input and interactions between the
log input. Specification (2), (4) and (6) additionally controls for individual plant specific characteristics
such as industry and age of plants. The standard errors are clustered at region-year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Figure 1.1: Trend of Freshmen Quota and Actual Freshmen Enrollment
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Figure 1.2: Correlation between Freshmen Quota in 1979 and 1981 by Colleges
Figure 1.3: Correlation between Freshmen Quota in 1979 and 1981 by Region
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Figure 1.4: Correlation between Pre-trend of Change in Human Capital Level and
Size of Freshmen Quota by Region
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Figure 1.5: Correlation between Post-trend of Change in Human Capital Level and
Size of Initial Freshmen Quota by Region
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Figure 1.6: Proportion of College Graduate and White-Collar among Workers by
Year
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Figure 1.7: Trend of Proportion of College Graduates and White-Collar among
Workers by Cohort
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Figure 1.8: Proportion of High School Graduates among Workers by Year
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Figure 1.9: Trend of Average Capital Per Worker and Share of College Graduates
among Workers
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Figure 1.10: Proportion of individuals with Some College Education by Birth Co-
hort (Source: Park and Son (2012))
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Figure 1.11: Age Adjusted Average Monthly Wage of Workers by Birth Cohort
(Source: Park and Son (2012))
Chapter 2
The Impact of College Education
on Labor Market and
Non-pecuniary Outcomes
2.1 Introduction
The past couple of decades have seen rapid increases in higher education enroll-
ments. The pace of growth varies considerably across countries, with relatively
little growth in countries like the United States and Israel, where higher education
attainment was already quite high in the late 1990s: in contrast, historically low
attainment countries such as South Korea, Belgium and France have experienced
more than a 40% point increase in higher education attainment.1
Despite the salience of these trends, there is only a limited understanding of
1Source: OECD report of Education at a Glance 2011.OECD report have redefined tertiary edu-
cation category to make international comparison possible hence the definition of tertiary education
in this report could be different from what we define as higher education or college education in the
sections that follow. Figure 2.1 graphically illustrates the trend in tertiary education.
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the causal impact of this expansion, in part because it is difficult to observe ex-
ogenous variation in college enrollment. Most examples of exogenous variation in
education come from institutional changes such as compulsory education or mini-
mum school leaving age which allow one to examine returns to primary education
or secondary education (Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000; Oreopoulos, 2006; Angrist &
Krueger, 1991). Due to the lack of exogenous institutional variation in higher ed-
ucation, studies of the returns to college education have been limited. Currie and
Moretti (2003) uses new college openings to identify the impact of mother’s college
education on children health. Card (1993) uses proximity to college as instrument
to study the impact on earnings. However, it is hard to completely rule out that
both college and residential location are endogenous.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by providing an arguably causal
estimate of the impact of college education on wages and health outcomes using
a natural experiment in South Korea. Specifically, the education reform of July
1980 discretely increased the opportunity for college education by increasing the
college freshman quota, the centrally mandated size of the freshman entering class.
This resulted in a large increase in the proportion of individuals with some college
education for cohorts born on or after 1962. We exploit this sharp difference in the
proportion of population with college education across adjacent cohorts to apply a
regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of higher education.
In addition to labor market outcome and health behavior, we explore outcomes
that have not been previously addressed in the literature, such as private transfers
and savings behavior. These analyses potentially shed light on the mechanism
through which college education attainment operates to increase welfare.
We find that college education improves labor market outcomes of individuals
mainly through an increase in labor income. In addition, we document that the
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individuals with higher education are more aware of harmfulness of smoking. In
particular, we document that the individuals with higher education are more likely
to try quit smoking although we do not find any causal effect of higher education
on incidence of smoking. We also find higher savings among the cohorts affected
by the reform compared to the unaffected cohorts. This implies that the increase
in earnings is not fully absorbed by an increase in expenditure, but some of the
increased earnings induces positive savings. From the current analysis we cannot
completely distinguish whether the increase in savings results from an increase in
earnings or heightened propensity to save. However, we do find that individuals
with college education are more likely to save regularly suggesting that there is
some behavioral change induced by college education. These findings are in line
with recent literature documenting the effect of education in various aspects of life
(Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009; Dee, 2004).
Moreover, we find a positive impact on the likelihood of inter-vivo transfers
between elderly parents and adult children, which suggests that college education
could serve as old age insurance in developing countries. The motivation behind
this transfer could be altruistic in which case the college educated child has a higher
earnings capacity so that she has higher likelihood of providing transfer to her el-
derly parents. Another possible explanation could be an exchange, or quid pro quo,
motive. Since the college educated individual received her parents’ investment in
education, the child repays her parents by providing transfers at old age. We might
make progress in disentangling these two stories if we had education and earnings
information on siblings, unfortunately with the current dataset we do not.
The main channels of higher education that positively affects each set of out-
come are robust on different specifications for controlling the birth year trend in
the outcome variable. The effect of the higher education on labor income and on
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probability of attempting to try quit smoking is particularly robust across different
specifications. In addition, the effect of higher education on the amount of savings
and probability of transferring to their parents is mostly stable on the inclusion of
higher order trends and splines.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the back-
ground of the policy in Korea. Section 3 provides an overview of the main data,
KLIPS. Section 4 presents the identification strategy, and Section 5 presents the
main empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Education reform of 1980
Unlike other countries, the number of freshman admitted by colleges—the fresh-
man quota—was controlled by the government in South Korea. The admission
guidelines for both private and public colleges were centrally controlled, hence the
freshman quota was applied to all types of colleges nationally. The freshman quota
was strictly administered and was subject to a sizable noncompliance penalty in-
cluding a loss of the government funding and/or subsidy and a reduction in fresh-
men quota the following year.
The supply of higher education institution was regulated centrally as well. Es-
tablishing a new college required government permission, and the government
kept the number of colleges more or less stable during our period of interest.2
These two restrictions rendered the supply of college graduates exogenous to the
demand for college education and returns to college education. Despite the rising
demand for college education, the government adjusted the of entrance quota only
2The government eventually made the restriction for establishing new college less strict in 1996
CHAPTER 2 47
to a limited extent. This resulted in a large increase of the number of ’retakers’ who
took the college entrance exam and applied for college more than once.3
The freshman entrance quota was replaced by a graduation quota by the edu-
cation reform of July 30, 1980. This change was completely unexpected as it was a
strategic action by a military junta to gain political popularity. The reform quickly
followed the formation of military junta by coup d’ètat of December, 1979 subse-
quent to President Park Chung-hee’s assination on October 1979. The main objec-
tives of the reform were to reduce the pool of retakers, increase quality of college
graduates through competition during college, and expand higher education op-
portunities to the disadvantaged population.
The details of the reform are as follows. Prior to the reform, the supply of
college graduates were set using the freshman quota. After the reform, a gradua-
tion quota was set, stipulating the number of individuals that would be allowed to
graduate. The freshman quota was calculated to correspond to 130% of the grad-
uation quota. The reform stated that 30% of the admitted students would be dis-
charged before graduation based on performance.
However, the discharge of students was not adhered to in practice. The gov-
ernment made discharge discretionary in 1983 so virtually none of the freshman
affected by the 1980 education reform faced the possibility of dismissal.4 The grad-
uation quota system was abolished in 1988 and the government returned to fresh-
man quota as a single medium to regulate the supply of college graduates. As a
result, the 1980 education reform effectively increased the number of college grad-
3In Korea, college entrance exam is held once a year at the end of the school year, so retakers were
those whose exam results were unsatisfactory, or those couldn’t get into the school they wanted and
decided to wait until the next year to take the entrance exam again. There are no limits to how many
number of college entrance exams they could retake. Students graduate after they finish their 3rd
grade of high school, hence retakers are either high school graduates or G.E.D holders
4The government later allowed the student who was already discharged to reentered the school
and finish his/her college degree
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uates for the cohort affected by the reform. The resulting sizable increase in the
freshman quota is presented in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between the freshmen quota in 1981 and
freshmen quota in 1979. It verifies that the increase in 1981 freshman quota as a
result of the reform was mostly proportional to 1979 freshman quota which was
set by the previous government. Thus this figure provides strong evidence against
the possibility that the quota increase was endogenous to regional demand or dif-
ferences in the returns to education across regions.
2.2.2 The Education System in South Korea
The education system in South Korea consists of 6 years of elementary school, 3
years of middle school, 3 years of high school, and 2 or 4 years of college. The
school year corresponds closely with the calendar year so the first semester is
March to June and the second semester is September to December. An individual
who is 7 years old as of March is mandated to enter elementary school. Elementary
school became compulsory in 1952 and middle school became compulsory in 1998.
In this paper we utilize the fact that the first cohort that was affected by this re-
form is the cohort that took the entrance exam in December 1980. A single college
entrance exam is administered at the end of each year and only students who com-
pleted 3 years of high school or the equivalent can take the exam. Hence the cohort
first affected by the reform is the cohort born in 1962, since these are the individ-
uals who are high school seniors in December 1980. Due to the discrete increase
of freshman quota in 1980, we expect a discrete jump in the fraction of college ed-




This paper uses the 1st to 11th wave of the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study(KLIPS).
KLIPS is similar to PSID in the U.S. as the data tracks the household and has infor-
mation at both the household and the individual level for household members. The
data is collected by the Korean Labor Institute to provide information about labor
force participation, income and consumption, health and retirement. It is an annual
panel of roughly 4,248-5,116 households and 11,541-13,321 individuals per wave,
and contains detailed demographic information, labor market variables, income,
assets, savings and various other economic variables. It also contains information
about health related behavior and indicators such as ADL score, subjective health,
smoking and drinking history. The first wave of KLIPS corresponds to 1998 and
each year thereafter. Hence the 1962 birth year cohort are of age 36 in the 1st wave.
Thus, these data allow researchers to examine the effect of the higher education
when the individuals are at the prime of their career.
As the reform was mainly targeted to the disadvantaged population, we limit
our sample to the population that initially had low college education attainment
and hence are likely to be more affected by the increase in the college freshmen
quota. In particular, we exclude individuals whose location of residence at age 14
is in Seoul Metropolitan area and 6 Metropolitan cities, since the college advance
rate was already relatively high in urban areas prior to the reform.5 The number
of individuals in the data is initially 17,989 and the exclusion brings the sample
down to 8,852. We further restrict our sample to those individuals whose father has
less than college education. We lose 974 individuals and the sample size becomes
7,878. Following the literature on labor outcomes, we focus on the male population
to avoid complications related to labor market participation decisions by female
5The six metropolitan cities are: Busan, Daegu, Daejeon, Incheon, Gwangju and Ulsan
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individuals. Finally, we limit the window of the main analysis to those whose birth
year is 20 years before and after 1962. The resulting final sample size is 2,751.
We provide the following evidence that the reform indeed targeted the disad-
vantaged population. Figure 2.4 shows that prior to 1962, the fraction with college
education was much higher in the non sample area than our sample area, despite
having a similar trend.
We use measures of individual wage and/or individual labor income and house-
hold labor income to investigate pecuniary returns to college education. In analyz-
ing individual labor income we look at all self-employed workers and employed
workers who are regular workers aged between 27 and 55, with CPI adjusted
monthly income of more than or equal to KRW 1,000,000.6
In addition to monetary returns to education, we explore the effect of higher ed-
ucation on savings and smoking behavior and examine whether education makes
individuals more patient or forward looking and less likely to be susceptible to ad-
diction. To perform these analyses, we examine whether the individuals has made
certain behavior regularly during the period when data was collected.
Next, to explore intergenerational family dynamics we study the difference in
private transfers to the elderly parents. In particular, we explore whether individ-
uals make transfer to their parents regularly. In South Korea, the celebration of the
60th and 70th birthday is particularly important, hence it could be that even if there
is no change in the general transfer behavior an individual might make a one-time
transfer due to a specific event. In order to avoid counting the aforementioned
instances as a behavioral change, we define regular private transfer behavior as
taking that action more than twice or three times throughout the entire 11 waves.
Table 2.1 presents a summary of characteristics of individuals in the sample.
6$1,000 using exchange rate of KRW1000/$ 1
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The first row shows the mean birth year of individuals in our sample. The second
and third rows refer to the education level of individual’s father. We see that for
the individuals of interest, about 16% of the fathers have education levels of high
school or more. The next two rows refer to the education level of the individuals of
our interest. About 65% have education level of high school or more which is much
higher than that of their fathers. About 19% of the individuals have education
levels of college or more. 80% have been married and these individuals have on
average 2.69 children. The last row of the summary table shows that there is a high
prevalence of smoking behavior in South Korea for born 20 years before and after
1962.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The 1980 education reform presents an opportunity to evaluate the impact of col-
lege education using a regression discontinuity design by comparing individuals
born before and after 1962. The RD design relies on the idea that individuals born
just before 1962 serve as a good control group for those born right after 1962. The
running variable for the analysis is birth year as implied by the rules of the reform.
The underlying assumption is that college education and the outcome variables
of interest are a smooth function of birth year in the absence of the education re-
form. For the first stage to be valid, we assume that unobservable characteristics
such as the preference for college education and ability are smooth in birth year. To
justify our assumption we show that observable characteristics that may be corre-
lated with college education are smooth in the running variable. In particular, we
show that father’s education level is smooth around the birth year of 1962. Figure
2.5 and 2.6 present the proportion of individuals whose father’s education level is
more than middle school and more than high school, respectively.
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Sorting is not a concern in our setting since the parents of the sample individ-
uals could not have foreseen this reform of 1980 when planning birth. Figure 2.7
describes the density of the running variable. One can verify that there is little
evidence of sorting across birth cohorts around 1962.
Our discontinuity is not sharp but fuzzy in birth year due to three reasons: i)
not everyone desires to go to college ii) not everyone who desires is able to enter
and iii) the existence of retakers.7 As we mentioned earlier, some of the students
born prior to 1962 but re-taking the exam in 1980 and afterwards would also be
affected by this reform. Thus we use the dummy variable for being born in or after
1962 as an instrument for college education. The first stage regression is as follows:
Collegei = δ0 + δ1Treati + f (birthyeari) + ε i (2.1)
Collegei is a dummy variable for whether individual i has some college edu-
cation. f (birthyeari) is a flexible function of birth year centered at 1962. We use
a linear spline which allows the effect to vary on either side of the cutoff. ε i is an
error term clustered on birth year. Treati is a binary variable that indicates whether
the individual was affected by the 1980 education reform. This variable is defined
as:
Treati = {
1 if birthyeari ≥ 1962
0 if birthyeari < 1962
Basically, this regression discontinuity design compares the outcome of cohorts
affected by the education reform of 1980 to the cohorts born too early to be affected.
The main coefficient δ1 estimates first stage relationship between being born after
1962, and thus being affected by the policy, and receiving some college education.
7Being born after 1961 does not correspond directly to having some college education.
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The reduced form effect estimation is as follows:
Yib = β0 + β1Treati + f (birthyeari) + ε i (2.2)
The coefficient β1 is our intent-to-treat effect of interest. The calculation of
treatment effect estimated by the usual 2SLS instrumental variables regression is
attained by β1δ1 .
2.5 Results
2.5.1 First Stage
As expected, Figure 2.8 displays a discrete increase in the fraction of individuals
with some college education at the 1962 birth year. Prior to 1962, the fraction of
college educated individuals was stable around 13% on average with very little
growth for all the cohorts in our sample born prior to 1962 . However, in 1962 the
fraction jumps to more than 22% and rapidly increases thereafter. This graphical
illustration is supported by the regression result presented in Table 2.2.
The coefficient of the binary treatment variable is highly significant: A strong
first stage. It shows that individuals born after 1961 are 14 percentage points more
likely to attain some college education than those born before 1962.
2.5.2 Labor Market Outcomes
We study the impact of some college education on employment and on two differ-
ent measures of income: CPI-adjusted log monthly wage at the individual level,
and CPI-adjusted log annual labor income at the household level.
The coefficients in Column (1) of Table 2.3 presents the intent-to-treat effect on
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the likelihood of being employed to be 3% points.8 Figure 2.9 illustrates the find-
ings. Column (2) of Table 2.3 evaluates the impact of college education on the
probability of being a salary worker as oppose to being self employed. It shows
that college education does not seem to have an effect on the probability that an
individual is a salary worker. All in all, college education seems to have moderate
effect on being employed, but little impact on being self employed conditional on
employment.
Next, we examine the effect of college education on log monthly labor income.
Table 2.4 documents the result. There is sizable and significant increase in labor
income that is robust across different specifications which allow for various sets of
controls including occupation and region of residence at age 14. In particular, we
find that log monthly individual labor income increases by 9-12% for salary work-
ers and 9-10% for all workers. Moreover, as describe in Column (3) and (4) of Table
2.A.1, the magnitude of the effect of higher education on labor income is consis-
tent and statistically significant across different specifications for f (birthyeari) in
equation (2.2). Figures 2.11 and 2.12 confirm this finding.
We summarize our findings on earnings by illustrating the life-time wage pro-
file of workers born before and after 1962. Figure 2.13 shows life time wage profiles
from age 35 to age 45 for workers born between 1959 to 1964. There exists a sizable
gap between the wage profile of workers born in 1961 and 1962 compared to the
wage profile gap between other adjacent cohorts, which are aligned closely.
These results suggest that the 1980 education reform had sizable labor market
consequences on individuals affected by the reform. Considering South Korea’s
rapid growth in the late 1980s to early 1990s, which induced large demand for high
8The effect of higher education on the probability of being employed, however, is not robust across
the different specification. In particular, as one can verify in Column (1) of Table 2.A.1, the reduced
form effect of higher education becomes statistically insignificant as one a higher order spline is
included.
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skilled workers, combined with the low level of initial college graduates, the size
of the impact on earnings and employment seems reasonable.
One interesting pattern is that despite the fact that the proportion of individuals
with at least some college education continued to increase after 1962 as in Figure
2.8, the wage pattern in Figure 2.12 displays a discrete jump at 1962 and a decreas-
ing slope thereafter. One possible explanation is that this results from a combina-
tion of the effect of decreasing wage premium for college graduates as the supply
of college graduates increase and the effect of 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The lit-
erature documents some evidence that initial labor market conditions have lasting
effects on earnings and labor market outcomes of college graduates (Oreopoulos,
von Wachter, & Heisz, 2012). Since the Asian financial crisis occurred at the end of
1997, the 1962 cohort was 35 and already in the labor market when the crisis had
hit, but later cohorts experienced the crisis when they were just entering the labor
market. Hence wage contracts were likely to be unfavorable to these later cohorts.
2.5.3 Savings Outcomes
In this section we study the impact of college education on savings behavior. Figure
2.14 displays a sizable positive effect of schooling on log savings. Column (1) of
Table 2.5 shows that having some college education increases the average amount
of CPI-adjusted new savings by 38%.9 We also show that the effect persists after we
restrict the sample to individuals who save more than twice throughout 11 waves,
in column (2) of Table 2.5. This implies that the increase in log average savings is
not due to a one time lump sum increase in savings, but an average increase for
regular monthly savings.
The discrete jump in savings could arise for several reasons. First, the increase
9New savings refers to the flow of new savings and not the existing stock
CHAPTER 2 56
in monthly income may explain the increase in savings. This is a possible hypoth-
esis as the pattern of discontinuity in Figure 2.14 is similar to that of Figure 2.12.
Another possible explanation is that individuals with some college education may
have lower discount factors or are more forward looking and accumulate more
precautionary savings.
This savings result may not be generalizable to developed countries where in-
terest on savings is low, but is pertinent to the developing world where savings
interests are high and borrowing constraints might exist due to less developed fi-
nancial markets. In South Korea, savings interest rates have been high enough to
attract savings particularly in early to mid 1990s, and mortgage products are still
undeveloped.
2.5.4 Smoking Behavior
In this section we study the impact of college education on three aspects of smok-
ing behavior; namely ever smoking, tried to quit smoking, and successfully quit.
Our results suggests that there is some behavioral gain through higher education
attainment.
The literature on schooling and health generally agrees there is a positive corre-
lation between health outcomes and education (Grossman, 2005). However, the lit-
erature has produced limited knowledge regarding whether education has a causal
impact on health, and regarding what the operating mechanism is. For instance,
Kenkel, Lillard, and Mathios (2006) finds little evidence of impact of high school
completion on the probability of smoking currently using the cost and difficulty
of high school graduation as an IV. Sander (1995) shows evidence that schooling
increases the probability of quitting, but there is a high possibility that the instru-
ment, parent’s education, is does not satisfy the exclusion restriction.
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We first examine the impact of college education on the probability of ever
smoking. For all birth years prior to 1962, the percentage of individuals who ever
smoke in our sample is fairly high, with an average of 80% as seen in Figure 2.15. A
possible explanation for this initially high rate of smoking is that in the 1980s when
the cohort born near 1962 were in their early 20s, the information regarding the
harmfulness of smoking was less salient.10 Table 2.6, column (1) shows that there
is negative but insignificant effect of college education on the likelihood of ever
smoking. With such a high prevalence of smoking among males in South Korea
during this period, college education does not seem to have discouraged individu-
als from starting to smoke.
Now we restrict ourselves to those who have previous smoking history and
study their quitting behavior. The effect of college education on the likelihood of
trying to quit is sizable. Figure 2.16 displays a large discrete jump at birth year 1962.
Table 2.6 column (2) confirms this finding. The coefficient on the binary treatment
variable is highly significant and positive, implying that people with some college
education are roughly 15% points more likely to have tried to quit smoking.11
However, our data suggest it is doubtful whether those people who tried to
quit were actually successful. Figure 2.17 shows a decreasing trend in birth year of
successfully quitting smoking. The high fraction of quitting for older individuals
is consistent with the fact that older males have health reasons that provides them
more immediate and salient reasons to quit, and the fact that there would be se-
lection in that older males who do not quit are deceased and out of the sample. If
we take these effects into account, it is probable that the fraction of successful quit-
10For example, it is recent that the tobacco companies started stating the harmfulness of smoking
on cigarette packages
11Column (2) -(4) of Table 2.A.2 provide a robustness check for the effect of higher education on
smoking. In particular, Column (3) shows a sizable and consistent effect of higher education on
quitting behavior.
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ters is stable around the 1962 cutoff. The coefficient is insignificant as presented in
column (2) of Table 2.6.
The three results combined suggest that college education has little impact on
reducing the incidence of ever smoking but it has an effect in inducing individuals
to try to quit smoking. Possible explanations for the positive impact on trying
to quit are that college education increases exposure to new information on the
harmfulness of smoking, or that college education increases self-control.
2.5.5 Transfer Behavior
Finally we examine whether private transfer behavior towards elder parents is dif-
ferent among individuals who attained some college from those who did not.12
Table 2.7 summarizes the regression results for inter-vivo transfers to parents.
Column (1) displays that having some college education increases the probability
of providing transfers by 10% points. The effect is positive and significant and
confirmed by a discrete jump in birth cohort 1962 in Figure 2.18.
In column (2) we estimate a binary outcome variable that takes a value of one
when the individual provides transfers more than 3 times in all 11 waves and zero
otherwise. This variable captures whether the individual engages in regular trans-
fer behavior. Comparing column (1) and column (2) suggests that having some
college education has a greater impact on providing regular transfers. This finding
is confirmed by comparing figures 2.18 and 2.19, as one can see the greater jump
in the latter.t However, column (3) shows that treatment has no effect on the log
amount of transfers provided. Combined with the existence of the effect on the
action of providing transfers, it suggests that individuals with some college edu-
12Note that the transfers are only recorded for the elderly parents who do not coreside with the
individual. Thus if the proportion of individuals who do not coreside with their parents changes
discretely around the 1962 cohort, the internal validity of this analysis will be compromised. Fortu-
nately, the fraction of non-coresidency is smooth around the 1962 cutoff.
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cation may have more frequent interaction with their parents and this interaction
compensates for the smaller transfer amount. If South Korean parents regarded
their child’s college education as an investment for old age insurance, the benefit
that they reap in the future is not necessarily monetary but may come in the form
of non-pecuniary social interactions.13
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we examined various returns to college education using an exogenous
increase in the supply of college education induced by a reform in South Korea.
Due to the school entry law, the education reform had the greatest impact on the
birth cohorts born after 1962. Thus we employ a regression discontinuity design
using birth cohort as running variable to estimate the impact of higher education
on various outcomes: labor market outcomes, savings behavior and private trans-
fer behavior. Consistent with the previous literature, we find that having college
education improves labor market outcomes through increase in labor income. The
earnings increase is present for both salary workers and self employed workers.
We also find that savings increase as the head of household has more college
education and that the effects persist after we restrict attention to those who make
regular savings. Smoking behavior is affected by college education as well. While
ever smoking or quitting smoking are not significantly affected by college educa-
tion, college education increases the likelihood that an individual who has a smok-
ing history tries to quit smoking. Finally, we find that provision of private transfers
from the adult child to his elderly parents becomes more likely and more regular
as an individual attains some college education.
13Column (5) - (6) of Table 2.A.2 provide the regression discontinuity estimates for the various
specifications for f (birthyeari) in equation (2.2). The results are mostly consistent with the main
specification except for the specification with a quadratic spline.
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The main policy implication of this paper is that promoting college education
is beneficial not only in terms of earnings increase but in terms of non pecuniary
and behavioral gains. The experience of South Korea might not be generalizable
to countries that already have high proportion of higher education attainers, but it
yields important implications for developing countries with low higher education-
levels.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of Population that has attained tertiary education by age
group(2009)
Figure 2.2: Freshman entrance quota
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Figure 2.3: Freshman entrance quota in 1979 and 1981 by location
Figure 2.4: Pre trend in fraction with some college education
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Figure 2.5: Fraction of father with more than middle school education
Figure 2.6: Fraction of father with more than high school education
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Figure 2.7: Density by birth year
Figure 2.8: First Stage: Fraction with some college education
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Figure 2.9: Fraction employed
Figure 2.10: Fraction of salary workers
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Figure 2.11: Age adjusted log monthly income
Figure 2.12: Age adjusted log monthly income
CHAPTER 2 67
Figure 2.13: Life time wage profile of individuals born in 1959 -1964
Figure 2.14: Cpi adjusted log monthly savings
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Figure 2.15: Fraction of individuals who ever smoked
Figure 2.16: Fraction of individuals who tried quit smoking
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Figure 2.17: Fraction of individuals who quit smoking
Figure 2.18: Ever provided private transfers to parents
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Figure 2.19: Provided private transfers regularly
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Figure 2.20: Log monthly private transfers to parents
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
mean sd N
birth year 1958.11 16.90 3742
middle school or more 0.30 0.46 3742
high school or more 0.16 0.37 3742
some college or more 0.19 0.39 3742
ever married 0.81 0.39 3738
number of children 2.69 1.50 2477
ever smoke 0.72 0.45 2913
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Table 2.2: First Stage Regression







The standard errors are clustered at the birth year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 2.3: Employment and Class of Workers
Dependent Variable being employed being salary worker
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treat 0.03293** 0.03190** 0.03532 0.03509
(0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0233) (0.0217)
adj. R-sq 0.02 0.021 0.050 0.055
first stage 0.09009*** 0.08819*** 0.10742*** 0.10630***
(0.0184) (0.0187) (0.0195) (0.0197)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.063 0.069 0.060 0.066
N 17808 17808 15774 15774
All specification includes year fixed effect and square in age. Specification (2) and (4)
additionally controls for region where individual lived when they were 14. The stan-
dard errors are clustered at the birth year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 2.4: Log amount of individual labor income
Sample salary worker all worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat 0.12283*** 0.09594*** 0.09499*** 0.10360*** 0.09843*** 0.09530***
(0.0292) (0.0245) (0.0248) (0.0244) (0.0219) (0.0214)
adj. R-sq 0.161 0.298 0.302 0.099 0.17 0.174
treat 0.19209*** 0.14220*** 0.13988*** 0.13867*** 0.11365*** 0.11229***
(0.0373) (0.0356) (0.0345) (0.0235) (0.0212) (0.0213)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.045 0.3 0.303 0.057 0.288 0.29
N 7704 7702 7702 13113 13110 13110
All specification includes year fixed effect and square in age. Specification (2) and (5) controls for
occupation of household head. Specification (3) and (6) additionally controls for region where
individual lived when they were 14. The standard errors are clustered at the birth year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 2.5: Savings
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable new savings # savings>2
treat 0.38324*** 0.28312***
(0.0987) (0.0648)
adj. R-sq 0.028 0.018
N 2018 1686
first stage 0.13382*** 0.14988***
(0.0327) (0.0323)
Linear Spline Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.060 0.067
N 2018 1686
The standard errors are clustered at the birth year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 2.6: Smoking
Dependent Variable ever smoke try quit smoke quit smoke
(1) (2) (3)
treat -0.00214 0.14657*** 0.06216
(0.0381) (0.0384) (0.0458)
adj. R-sq 0.008 0.007 0.063
first stage 0.16791*** 0.12199*** 0.14871***
(0.0395) (0.0318) (0.0319)
Linear Spline Y Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.060 0.048 0.055
N 2251 1417 1732
The standard errors are clustered at the birth year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 2.7: Transfers to Parents
Dependent Variable ever give num give>4 log transfer
(1) (2) (3)
treat 0.10875*** 0.18430*** 0.11489
(0.0245) (0.0246) (0.1162)
adj. R-sq 0.190 0.098 -0.000
first stage 0.12316*** 0.12316*** 0.18041***
(0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0430)
Linear Spline Y Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.056 0.056 0.078
N 2112 2112 1214
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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2.A Appendix
Table 2.A.1: Robustness check for effect of higher education on labor market
outcomes
dependent variable being employed being salary worker log wage(salary) log wage(all)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Linear trend 0.0296** 0.0371* 0.0930*** 0.0953***
(0.0147) (0.0216) (0.0241) (0.0214)
Quadratic trend 0.0295** 0.0372* 0.0896*** 0.0945***
(0.0145) (.0215) (0.0243) (0.0218)
Cubic trend 0.0128 0.0144 0.0810*** 0.1045***
(.0159) (0.0237) (0.0263) (0.0261)
Quadratic spline 0.0061 0.007 0.0771*** 0.1064***
(0.0158) (0.0273) (0.0281) (0.0292)
Cubic spline 0.0025 .0039 .0838*** 0.1292***
(0.0183) (0.0280) (0.0301) (0.0343)
The standard errors are clustered at the birth year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 2.A.2: Robustness check for effect of higher education on saving, smoking and
transfer
dependent variable savings ever smoke try quit smoke quit smoke ever give num give>4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linear trend 0.2533*** -0.0204 0.1663*** 0.0651 0.0713** 0.1134**
(0.0638) (0.0475) (0.0392) (0.0448) (0.0370) (0.0441)
Quadratic trend 0.2994*** -0.0132 0.1666*** 0.0564 0.1096*** 0.1760***
(0.0621) (0.0411) (0.0394) (0.0442) (0.0257) (0.0235)
Cubic trend 0.2516*** 0.0107 0.1534*** 0.0660 0.1163*** 0.0893***
(0.0792) (0.0580) (0.0500) (0.0614) (0.0320) (0.0243)
Quadratic spline 0.1782 0.0278 0.1355*** 0.0740 0.1258*** 0.0524
(0.1076) (0.0596) (0.0448) (0.0624) (0.0359) (0.0398)
Cubic spline 0.2850** 0.1167* 0.1648*** 0.1208* 0.1229*** 0.1345***
(.1297) (0.0657) (0.0545) (.0629) (0.0440) (.0337)
The standard errors are clustered at the birth year level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Chapter 3
The Effect of Higher Education on
the Careers of Workers
3.1 Introduction
A large body of literature documents the pecuniary return to higher education
by comparing the wages of high school and college graduates (Juhn, Murphy, &
Pierce, 1993; Katz & Autor, 1999). However, the effects of higher education on
other important aspects of individuals’ careers—such as job mobility, training and
sorting across jobs—have not been well documented.
Moreover, there is only a small amount of research relating how higher educa-
tion affects the different career patterns among high school and college graduates.
Since Becker (1964) and Spence (1973), the key functions of higher education have
been described as human capital accumulation and the signaling of ability. Al-
though these two functions have clear implications for the source of the return to
higher education, it is not clear how they affect the subsequent careers of workers.1
1For instance, given the human capital accumulation function of higher education, college grad-
78
CHAPTER 3 79
This paper documents the effects of higher education that yields clear predic-
tions on the careers of workers after their graduations. Specifically, the productivity
revealing function of higher education has been recently documented by Arcidia-
cono, Bayer and Hizmo (2010) (ABH (2010) hereafter). ABH (2010) asserts that
college graduates’ wages are correlated with their own abilities while the wages of
high school graduates unrelated to their individual ability in the beginning of their
careers. The authors interpret their findings as evidence that supports the existence
of the productivity revealing function of higher education.
In addition to ABH (2010), there are several papers which also document the
pooling of young high school graduates and the possible mechanisms for the phe-
nomenon. For instance, Bishop (1994) asserts that high school graduates have dif-
ficulty promoting their high school achievements and firms have difficulty getting
information on school performance. He insists that, as a result, during the first
decade after leaving high school, young men do not receive rewards for develop-
ing competence in science, language arts and mathematical reasoning. Moreover,
Hotchkiss (1984) and Rosenbaum (1990) find that non-cognitive traits such as main-
taining low absenteeism, obeying the law, and using good study habits are also not
positively related to labor market outcomes immediately after high school. These
papers demonstrate that having both cognitive and non-cognitive skills—both of
which are believed to be related to productivity—is not reflected in the wages of
young high school graduates. Thus, at the early stages of their careers, high ability
high school graduates will be ‘pooled’ with low ability high school graduates.
In contrast to high school graduates, many aspects of a college education make
uates can either have more post-schooling training than high school graduates or less training de-
pending on the degree of complimentary between human capital obtained by schooling and human
capital obtained by training. Since the traditional theory mainly focuses on the separation of college
and high school graduates through different amount of schooling, it does not yield a testable pre-
diction on how each group will engage in productivity revealing activities after they enter the job
market.
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the abilities of young college graduates readily identifiable. For instance, unlike
high schools, most colleges have a dedicated department and/or personnel which
issue transcripts and certificates verifying the achievements of their graduates.
More importantly, as Hoxby (1997) documents, the abilities of students are ho-
mogenous within a university but heterogeneous across universities. Given the
sorting of students by the ranking or selectivity of colleges, potential employers
will obtain relatively accurate information about college graduates by simply ob-
serving the names of their alma maters. As a result, there will be a difference
in earning among young college graduates which will roughly coincide with the
different degree of selectivity across colleges. A recent paper by Hoekstra (2009)
shows that the graduates from highly selective colleges earn more than their coun-
terparts from less selective institutions in the early stages of their careers. He as-
serts that the signaling effect of being ‘flagship’ college graduates could lead to
an increase in earnings.2 Finally, MacLeod and Urquiola (2013) provide a novel
framework that explains the selectivity of colleges and examines the effect of the
selectivity of colleges on skill accumulation.
However, the sorting across high schools by students’s ability is not as clear
as with colleges since the admission to specific high schools is usually residence-
based. In addition, rankings among high schools are not well established or pub-
licly acknowledged like rankings among colleges are. Thus, the employer will need
further information about high school graduates to evaluate their abilities. Over-
all, the evidence from the existing literature suggests that high school graduates
are likely to be pooled together, whereas college graduates are separated at the
beginning of their careers.
Based on the evidence of the productivity revealing function of higher educa-
2Other literature that examines the return from attending more selective colleges includes Loury
& Garman (1995), Brewer, Eide & Ehrenberg (1999), Monks (2000) and Dale & Krueger (2002)
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tion, I argue that this function of higher education yields clear and unambiguous
predictions regarding worker’s subsequent productivity revealing behaviors. To
be concrete, if the individual abilities of high school graduates are not directly ob-
servable, high ability high school graduates will not be appropriately compensated,
since their wages will be set based on the average ability of high school graduates.
As a result, it is likely that high ability high school graduates will engage in activi-
ties that will separate them from low ability high school graduates after they start
their careers. More specifically, I predict that the high ability high school graduates
will be more likely to obtain off-the-job training, and more likely to sort themselves
into performance pay jobs in which the wage is closely related to ability.
Unlike high school graduates, high ability college graduates are not expected to
engage in costly activities to separate themselves from those of low ability since the
abilities of college graduates are apparent at the beginning of their careers. Thus,
the probability of participating in off-the-job training and sorting into performance
pay jobs would not be positively correlated with the measure of ability among
college graduates at the early stages of their careers.
Moreover, I expect that the job mobility of high ability high school graduates
will be higher than that of low ability counterparts as they move to better jobs and
differentiate themselves from low ability workers. However, their job mobility will
not necessarily depend on ability, since college graduates are assigned to jobs ac-
cording to their abilities from the beginning of their careers. Thus, the job mobility
of college graduate workers will be determined by the factors that are not related
to worker’s ability such as a random job match between employer and employee.
This mechanism provides an alternative explanation to the traditional search the-
ory that has been applied to explain the positive return to job mobility among high
school graduates in Topel & Ward (1992).
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I verify these predictions using NLSY79 data by documenting the different
relationships between AFQT scores and productivity revealing activities across
high school and college graduates. From the analysis, I observe the different pat-
terns of productivity revealing activities across high school and college graduates.
Those patterns coincide with the prediction of the signaling model under a differ-
ent degree of asymmetric information between employers and workers across two
groups. The results also illustrate the role of productivity revealing activities of
workers as an alternative mechanism for employer learning which helps explain
how the wage of high school workers eventually reflects their individual abilities.
The rest of the paper is organized into the following sections. In section 2, I
build a model of individual’s sorting behavior into higher education, and the sub-
sequent aspects of careers using a two stage model. Section 3 describes the testable
implications of the model for job mobility and productivity revealing activities. In
Section 4, an overview of NLSY79 and the sample construction are described, fol-
lowed by the identification strategy and estimating equation in Section 5. Section 6
presents the main empirical results that verify the prediction of the model. Section
7 compares this paper with the employer learning model, and Section 8 concludes.
3.2 Model
This section illustrates a base model that can explain individuals’ sorting into higher
education and productivity revealing activities under imperfect information. The
model is based on several assumptions about the cost of productivity revealing
activities and the distribution of workers’ ability.
1. There are individuals in an economy; each individual has innate ability, a
distributed as F(a). The employers do not have direct information about the
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individual abilities of workers.
2. The return from higher education is not negatively correlated with ability and
the cost of schooling is not positively correlated with ability.
3. The labor market is perfectly competitive. Thus, the wage of workers equals
the expected productivity of the workers
4. The cost of productivity revealing activities is not extremely high and the
dispersion of ability is large enough to make productivity revealing activities
profitable for some portion of top ability workers.
At the first stage, people decide whether they will sort themselves into higher
education or not. Under the commonly acknowledged functions of higher education—
signaling and human capital accumulation—and reasonable assumptions about
the costs of higher education, a certain portion of individuals from the top of the
ability distribution will sort themselves into higher education. Specifically, there is
an ability cutoff a∗ where individuals with ability greater than a∗ sort themselves
into higher education. Individuals who sort themselves into higher education be-
come college graduates and individuals who do not enter higher education remain
high school graduates. For simplicity, I ignore high school dropouts and individu-
als who have not completed college.34
At the beginning of the second stage, individuals finish their schooling and en-
ter the job market. The individuals then decide whether to engage in productivity
revealing activities that will further reveal their abilities. Employers know that
3It is worth noting that the prediction and implication of the model will not be dependent on
the source of the return to education. That is, motivation for education does not matter as long as
high ability individuals sort themselves into higher education. The productivity revealing function
of higher education will be applied to college graduates regardless of the workers’ motivation for
entering higher education.
4Including workers with only some college education will only make the model more complicated
without gaining meaningful implication.
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the average ability of college graduates is higher than the average ability of high
school graduates. Moreover, given the productivity revealing function of higher
education, college graduates will receive wages according to their individual abil-
ities. However, in regards to wages, high school graduates will be pooled at the
beginning of their careers, since employers cannot verify the individual abilities
of high school graduates. Thus, the wages of college workers whose abilities are
a will be a + H, where H is human capital accumulation from college education
whereas the wages of high school graduates will be E(a|a < a∗) regardless of the
value of individual abilities a.5
Thus, given these initial wages of high school graduates, some portion of high
ability high school graduates will engage in productivity revealing activities to sep-
arate themselves from low ability high school graduates, and to ultimately get paid
for their individual abilities. However, high ability college graduates will not en-
gage in costly productivity revealing activities since they are already separated
from both high school graduates and low ability college graduates. I exploit this
predicted difference in productivity revealing activities between high school and
college graduates to identify the effects of higher education on the subsequent ca-
reers of individuals.
3.3 Testable Implications
In this section, the prediction on productivity revealing activities based on the
model described in Section 3.2 is provided in detail. In particular, I describe off-
the-job training and sorting into performance pay jobs as productivity revealing
activities. I also predict the relationship between ability and job mobility for high
school graduates, and compare it with that for college graduates under differing
5The prediction of the model does not depend on the magnitude of human capital component, H.
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degrees of imperfect information across the two groups.
3.3.1 Off-the-Job Training
The previous literature on training mainly focuses on the human-capital-mediated
effect of training on wage increases or job mobility (Lynch, 1991, 1992; Parent,
1999). In contrast, here I view training mainly as a mean to reveal the produc-
tivity of workers. In particular, off-the-job training (OFT) is similar to schooling
in the sense that the worker pays the cost of the training, and the contents of the
training are not firm-specific. Given the similarities between off-the-job training
and schooling, off-the-job training can be used as a signaling device. Thus, as tra-
ditional signaling theory (Spence, 1973) would predict, the high ability workers
will be more likely to obtain OFT than their low ability counterparts if they are not
differentiated from their low ability counterparts.
Therefore, for the high school graduates whose abilities are not revealed at the
beginning of their careers, the probability of getting off-the-job training will be
positively related with their AFQT scores, as high ability high school graduates
use OFT as a productivity revealing device. However, for college graduates whose
individual abilities are already apparent, the probability of obtaining OFT will not
necessarily depend positively on measured ability. Moreover, since the return from
being separated from low ability workers decrease with time, the probability of get-
ting OFT will decrease faster with experience for high ability high school graduates
compared to their low ability counterparts. In other words, the experience gradi-
ent will be steeper for the high ability high school graduates whose motivation for
taking OFT depends on both signaling (productivity revealing) and human cap-
ital accumulation. However, I do not expect different experience gradient across
college graduates since the high ability college graduates do not have additional
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incentives to take OFT in the early stage of theirs careers.
3.3.2 Performance Pay
A recent paper by Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2009) asserts that as a result of
imperfect information about workers, high ability workers will have an incentive
to sort themselves into performance pay jobs so that they can reveal their high
productivity and receive wages that more closely reflect their abilities. Lemieux,
MacLeod and Parent support this argument by comparing the average AFQT score
of the workers in performance-pay jobs with AFQT scores of the workers in non-
performance-pay jobs. Adopting their view on performance pay jobs, one can cate-
gorize sorting behavior into performance pay jobs as a means to reveal the produc-
tivity of the workers. Thus, given the functions of higher education, the relation
between ability and having a performance pay job among high school graduates
will be differ from that among college graduates.
To be more specific, since high school graduates are pooled with each other at
the beginning of their careers, high ability high school graduates will try to sort
themselves into performance pay jobs and receive pay in relation to their individ-
ual abilities. However, unlike high school graduates, college graduates are differ-
entiated by their ability from the beginning of their careers. Thus, high ability col-
lege graduates will have little incentive to sort themselves into performance pay
jobs and pay additional monitoring costs to reveal their high abilities. In other
words, it is not necessary for high ability college graduates to sort themselves into
performance pay jobs; in fact it could be considered wasteful in the early stages of
their careers.
In sum, the probability of getting performance-pay jobs will depend positively
on AFQT scores among high school graduates in the early stages of their careers,
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whereas among college graduates the correlation between working at performance
pay jobs and AFQT scores will not be positive.6
3.3.3 Job Mobility
The positive relationship between wage increases and job mobility for young high
school graduates has been well documented by Topel & Ward (1992). They inter-
pret the results as supportive evidence for the search theory and view job mobility
as an important means for wage increases and as a step toward stable long-term
employment for high school graduates.7
In my paper, the positive return of job mobility among high school graduates is
regarded as a result of the positive return to productivity revealing behavior. More
concretely, high ability high school graduates will have higher job mobility than
low ability high school graduates as they engage in productivity revealing activi-
ties to differentiate themselves from their low ability counterparts so that they can
move to better jobs in the early stages of their careers. Thus, there will be a posi-
tive relation between wage increases and job mobility, as high ability high school
workers move to better jobs with higher wages. Moreover, as high ability high
school graduates obtain the jobs they deserve, the incentive to move to other jobs
will decrease over time, and, their careers will eventually stabilize. This implies
that the negative relationship between job mobility and potential experience will
be steeper for the high ability high school graduates than for low ability high school
6The difference in the probability of sorting themselves into performance pay jobs between high
school and college graduate workers can still exist, as college graduates are more likely to sort them-
selves into performance pay jobs. This fact does not contradict the model since the difference between
average high school and college graduates can be explained by other factors such as the differences
in job characteristics of college and high school graduates
7Unlike Topel & Ward (1992), Neumark (2002) views job mobility as a wasteful procedure. He




However, high ability college graduate workers will not have an incentive to
move between jobs at the cost of firm-specific human capital, since college grad-
uates are offered jobs according to their individual abilities from the beginning of
their careers. That is, high ability college graduate workers will not have to engage
in costly job searches and the related job mobility to separate themselves from their
low ability counterparts in the early stages of their careers. Moreover, since high
ability college graduates do not have high job mobility at the beginning of their
careers, the relationships between job mobility and potential experience will not
differ across ability among college graduates.
3.4 Data
To empirically verify the predictions regarding productivity revealing activities
and job mobility of workers, I use NLSY79 data for 1979-2006 period. The data
have been collected annually since 1979 and biannually since 1994. The respon-
dents were aged between 14 and 22 at the beginning of the survey. The data have a
number of advantages for analyzing post-schooling signaling behavior. First, pro-
ductivity revealing activities are most likely to be important in the early stages of
workers’ careers, and NLSY79 is precisely focused on this part of respondents’ life
cycle. Second, for the analysis of post-schooling behavior proposed in this paper,
information regarding workers’ ability is essential. NLSY79 contains the results of
AVSAB test which can be converted to an AFQT score. The AFQT score in NLSY79
has been widely accepted as a pre-market measure of ability (or cognitive skill).
Third, NLSY79 contains longitudinal information that enables the researcher to
determine workers’ transitions into the labor force. This information allows one
to calculate potential experience which is more precise than using the commonly
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used but arbitrary definition of potential experience (age-highest grade-6). Lastly,
the data have detailed information about the training of workers and their job char-
acteristics, including the payment structure of jobs.
For the main analysis, I restrict the sample to white males in order to avoid
tracking the variations in careers that might arise from differences in race and/or
gender. Following ABH (2010), I also limit the sample to respondents who have
completed 12 or 16 years of education and exclude high school dropouts and indi-
viduals who have completed some college education. I do not include respondents
who have military jobs or, jobs without pay, who are self-employed in CPS (main)
jobs, or who work for a family business. I also exclude labor market experience ac-
cumulated before individuals left school for the first time. The potential experience
is defined as the number of years since a respondent first finished schooling.
Furthermore, I restrict scope of the analysis to individuals for whom potential
experience is less than 13 years, thereby focusing on the early stages of their careers.
Another reason for this criteria of sample construction, as explained in ABH (2010),
is to keep the analysis simple by focusing on the approximately linear region of the
relation between log wages, AFQT scores, and potential experience.
The measure of ability, AFQT, is constructed using the definition provided by
the Department of Defense, and is standardized by the age of the individual at
the time of the test. The construction of performance pay indicator variable fol-
lows LMP (2009). The performance pay indicator takes a value equal to one if the
wage of CPS jobs includes a variable pay component such as a bonus, commis-
sion or piece-rate. For the off-the-job training variable, I follow Parent (1999) and
re-classify 12 training categories into three groups—on-the-job training (OJT), off-
the-job training (OFT), apprenticeship. The OFT indicator variable takes a value
equal to one if the respondent took any form of OFT—business colleges, nursing
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programs, vocational-technical institutes, etc.—in a given year. I use the hourly
wage rate of CPS jobs from the work history file as a measure of wages and obtain
the real wage by using the CPI index. The number of jobs in a given year is used as
a proxy for the job mobility of workers.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the main analysis sample. As expected,
the average of log wages and the average AFQT scores are higher for college grad-
uates than for high school graduates. College graduates are more likely to sort
themselves into performance pay jobs and to obtain training. Additionally, the
composition of training differs between the two groups as high school graduates
are more likely to obtain OFT and apprenticeships and are less likely to obtain OJT.
However, there is little difference in the number of jobs per year between college
and high school graduates.
3.5 Identification Strategy and Empirical Specification
The scarcity of exogenous variations that induce people to engage in college edu-
cation makes documenting the effect of college education challenging. There are a
few papers such as Card (1993) and Currie and Moretti (2003) that exploit the dis-
tance to college and college opening as an instrument for higher education. How-
ever, the validity of those instruments is perhaps more open to question—due to
the endogenous location of individuals and colleges—relative to other instruments
that induce people to take additional K-12 schooling, such as a change in a com-
pulsory schooling law.
My paper sidesteps this issue by following ABH (2010) and documents the dif-
ferent relationship between ability and outcomes between high school and college
graduates. I claim this difference as evidence supporting the effects of higher edu-
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cation on the subsequent careers of the workers.8 To be specific, I verify a positive
and statistically significant relationship between the incidence of productivity re-
vealing activities and the ability among high school graduates, while I find a non-
positive relationship among college graduates. I attribute this difference between
the two groups to the differences in the productivity revealing activities across the
two groups given the functions of college education.
The main empirical specification follows employer learning literature (Altonji
and Pierret (2001)) and regresses the outcome variable on a measure of ability, po-
tential experience and the interaction of the two. The following equation will be
estimated separately for high school and college workers:
Yit = β0 + β1AFQTi + β2Expit + β3AFQTi ∗ Expit + f (Expit) + δt +Φ′Xit + eit
(3.1)
where Yi is the outcome variable such as the wages of the workers, the number of
jobs held in a given year and the dummy variable for a having performance pay
jobs and engaging in off-the-job training. The coefficient of AFQTi, β1 , indicates
the correlation between the outcome variable and AFQT scores at the beginning of
individual’s career—when their potential experience is equal to zero. The coeffi-
cient of the interaction term, β3, captures the difference in the correlation between
experience and outcome across workers with different ability. The prediction of
the model will be supported by the examining difference in the statistical signifi-
cance and the sign of coefficients in each group. To be more concrete, β1 and β3 are
expected to be positive and negative respectively for high school graduates. On
the other hand, for the college graduates, the coefficients for AFQT scores and the
8ABH (2010) assert the difference in the statistical significance of the key coefficients across the
two groups as an evidence for the productivity revealing function of college education
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interaction term are expected to be non-positive and non-negative respectively.
In order to test the implications regarding performance pay jobs, the main spec-
ification will only have the AFQT score and a measure of potential experience as
an independent variable due to the data limitation.9 Thus, the implication of the
model will be verified by examining whether there is a difference in the relation
between having a performance pay job and the ability in the first 13 years of an
individual’s career across the two groups.
3.6 Results
This section provides the empirical results that verify the prediction of the model
regarding productivity revealing activities and job mobility of workers. Before pre-
senting the main results, I first replicate the main result of ABH (2010) to show the
productivity revealing function of higher education.
3.6.1 Replication of ABH (2010)
Table 2 shows the replication of ABH (2010). The results are qualitatively similar
to ABH (2010), for both college graduates and high school graduates. The AFQT
coefficient in column(3) is positive but small and statistically insignificant, which
implies that the wages of the high school graduates do not reflect their cognitive
abilities at the beginning of their careers (when their potential experience is zero).
9The data from the question about performance job are collected between 1988∼1990 and
1996∼2000 when most of respondents had already gained over 7 to 8 years of potential experience.
As a result, the estimation of β1 in equation (1) which estimates the AFQT scores and the outcome
at the beginning of workers’ careers will be unreliable. Moreover, since the collection of information
about performance pay is not continuous, β3 which estimates the relation between performance pay
and experience will also be unreliable. Thus, I only look at whether sorting into performance pay
depends on AFQT for the first 13 year of workers’ careers. The prediction of the model implies that
the AFQT coefficient will be positive and significant for high school graduates but insignificant for
the college graduates.
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The coefficient on the interaction term between AFQT scores and potential expe-
rience is positive and significant, which implies the wages of high school gradu-
ates eventually reflecting their individual abilities. In other words, the high school
graduates are pooled with each other at the beginning of their careers but are sep-
arated by AFQT scores eventually.
[Table 2 about here]
On the other hand, the results for college graduates show a different pattern,
as ABH(2010) finds. The AFQT coefficient in column(6) is sizable, positive and sig-
nificant whereas the interaction term is small and insignificant. Thus, unlike high
school graduates, college graduates are separated by their AFQT scores from the
beginning of their careers, and the additional separation associated with experi-
ence is insignificant. Figure 2 and Figure 3 below illustrate the wage dynamics for
high school and college graduates.
[Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here]
Taking into account that the variations in AFQT scores are much smaller among
college graduates than among high school graduates, this result seems to provide
a strong support for the argument that higher education fulfills a role for produc-
tivity revealing. Moreover, the result also provides evidence against the assertion
stating that job mobility and productivity revealing are due to the different vari-
ance in AFQT scores between each group.
3.6.2 Job Mobility(Number of Jobs)
Table 3 describes the results for the job mobility of workers. As expected, the job
mobility of high school graduates is positively related with ability at the beginning
of their careers. The coefficient of AFQT in column (3) is positive and significant at
the 5% level. In particular, one standard deviation increase in AFQT is associated
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with 0.12 more jobs per year in the early stage of high school graduates’ career. The
coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant for high school grad-
uates. This result coincides with the career of high ability high school graduates
which eventually stabilizes over with time. In other words, the potential experi-
ence gradient is steeper for high ability high school graduates since they will take
more jobs in the beginning of their careers than low ability high school workers will
take, although they will have similar job mobility later in their careers. Column (1)
also shows that the job mobility in the first 13 years of career is positively related
with the ability for high school graduates.
[Table 3 about here]
However, the results for college graduates display different patterns between
ability and job mobility. The data in column (6) suggest that, unlike the high school
graduates, job mobility does not depend on AFQT scores for college graduates.
The coefficients on both AFQT scores and the interaction term are statistically in-
significant for college graduate workers. These data suggest that factors, such as
the random job match quality between employers and employees, which will not
depend on the abilities of workers, might be a major determinant of the job mo-
bility among young college graduates. The results from column (4) also show that
job mobility and ability are not positively related in the first 13 years of college
graduates’ careers.
Overall, the results show that job mobility has different patterns among high
school and college graduates. These differences could shed light on the source of
return from job mobility which is described in Topel & Ward (1992). The results
suggest that the return from job mobility among high school graduates arises from
the correlation between ability—which is positively related with wages in the long
run—and job mobility. Moreover, given the positive return from firm specific hu-
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man capital, different patterns of job mobility also suggest a possible source of
positive pecuniary returns from higher education.
Since average job mobility, measured by the number of jobs in a given year, is
similar among high school graduate and college graduate workers, the results im-
ply that high ability high school graduates will have higher job mobility than both
low ability high school graduates and low ability college graduates in the begin-
ning of their careers. Thus, the low ability college graduates will accumulate more
firm specific human capital than high ability high school workers and can accel-
erate their wage growth as they do not have to move between jobs as high ability
high school graduates (Neumark, 2002). Since most of the literature documents the
return of higher education by comparing high ability high school graduates and
low ability college graduates, these results could be further interpreted as a source
of monetary return to higher education documented in those papers.
[Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here]
3.6.3 Post Schooling Productivity Activity (Off the Job Training and Per-
formance Pay Jobs)
Table 4 summarizes the results of off-the-job training. The probability of taking
OFT does not depend positively on the AFQT scores of college graduates in the
early stages of their careers as the AFQT coefficient in column (6) is negative and
not statistically significant at 5%. Further, the coefficient of the interaction term
between AFQT scores and potential experience is positive which would reject the
possibility of OFT being used as a productivity revealing device for high ability
college graduates. If OFT is used as a productivity revealing device, it should be
used more intensively by high ability college graduates in the early stages of their
careers. Overall, the evidence supports the view that for college graduates, pro-
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ductivity revealing is not a dominant motivation for receiving OFT. Column (4)
shows that there is little correlation between the incidence of off-the-job training
and ability in the first 13 years of the careers of college graduates.
[Table 4 and Table 5 about here]
However, for high school graduates, the results coincide with the prediction
that high ability high school graduates will use OFT as a mean for productivity
revealing. The AFQT coefficient in Column (3) is positive and significant, which
implies that at the beginning of careers, high ability high school graduates are more
likely to engage in OFT than their low ability counterparts. Moreover, the coeffi-
cient of the interaction term between AFQT scores and potential experience is neg-
ative which implies high ability high school graduates are more likely to undertake
OFT at the beginning of their careers compared to low ability high school gradu-
ates. This result also coincides with the prediction of the model since the return
of the productivity revealing component of OFT is higher in the early stages of a
career, and high ability high school graduates will engage in OFT more intensively
in the earlier stages of their careers.
The results for workers’ sorting behavior into performance pay jobs also pro-
vide evidence of different productivity revealing behaviors between high school
and college graduates. As described in Column (1) of Table 5, the probability
of having performance pay jobs depends positively on the AFQT scores for high
school graduates in the first 13 years of their careers. However, for college gradu-
ates AFQT scores do not affect the probability of obtaining performance paid jobs
during the early stages of their careers as the coefficient in Column (4) is not statis-
tically significant. Moreover, Column (3) and Column (6) also show that estimation
result using the potential experience and the interaction term between AFQT scores
and experience are fairly consistent with the prediction of the model.
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Based on the results discussed in this section, Figures 4 and 5 highlight the
different patterns of job mobility and productivity revealing activities across high
school and college graduates. Overall, the results provided in this section fit the
prediction of the model, thus, supporting evidence on the effects of higher educa-
tion on the subsequent careers of workers.
3.7 Comparison with Employer Learning Literature
Since the seminal work by Farber and Gibbons (1996), the role of employer learn-
ing on wage dynamics—the wages of young workers eventually being positively
related with AFQT scores—has been well documented by several papers such as
Altonji and Pierret (2001) and Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001). The basic em-
ployer learning model hinges on the public or symmetric employer learning which
assumes that the current employer’s information about the workers is being shared
with all potential employers. However, the existence of private or asymmetric
learning of employers makes the plausible mechanism of employer learning com-
plicated. As a result, only a small number of papers—Schoenberg (2007) and Pinkston
(2009)—proposed an employer learning mechanism that explains wage dynamics
under the private or asymmetric learning of employers. However, given the high
mobility of high school graduates in the early stages of their career (Topel & Ward,
1992), it seems unrealistic that information about average young workers could
be accumulated in a short time and then passed to outside employers through a
rather complicated process without a significant amount of loss in the information
as suggested in Schoenberg (2007) and Pinkston (2009).
By focusing on the incentives of high ability workers to reveal their produc-
tivity, this paper provides an alternative story for the wage dynamics of young
workers. Unlike the employers who do not have an incentive to reveal information
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about their high ability workers, the high ability workers have incentive to reveal
their abilities to their potential employers through productivity revealing activ-
ities. The property of the productivity revealing activity will simplify analysis of
wage dynamics since one does not have to consider the transmission of information
across employers. Moreover, explaining the wage dynamic using the incentives of
workers is more intuitive than relying on employer learning as it emphasizes the
role of workers who will actually gain from productivity revealing and the related
wage increases. 10
3.8 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, I documented the effects of the productivity revealing function of
higher education on the subsequent careers of individuals. Unlike the traditional
signaling and human capital accumulating functions, the productivity revealing
function of higher education yields a simple and unambiguous prediction on the
subsequent productivity revealing activities of high school and college graduates.
Using the model that extends the traditional signaling model, I linked the workers’
decisions to sort themselves into higher education and the subsequent productivity
revealing activities of individuals.
Given the productivity revealing function of higher education, the model pre-
dicts active productivity revealing behavior for high ability high school graduates
and little productivity revealing activity for high ability college graduates. Thus,
for the high school graduates, the productivity revealing activity will be positively
related to their ability since the high ability high school graduates will engage in
activities to separate themselves from low ability high school graduates. How-
10The employers will be indifferent about the wage distribution in this setting as long as the aver-
age wage equals the average productivity of workers.
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ever, among college graduates, productivity revealing activities and ability will
not be positively correlated since the high ability college graduates are already dis-
tinguished from low ability college graduates and have little incentive to engage in
costly productivity revealing activities.
Moreover, I predict that high ability high school graduates will have higher
mobility than low ability high school graduates at the beginning of their careers as
they are differentiated from low ability high school graduate workers and move to
the better jobs. Unlike high school graduates, the job mobility of college graduates
will not positively depend on their ability since the high ability college graduates
will have decent jobs from the beginning of their career and will not have an incen-
tive to move between jobs at the cost of firm specific human capital. Using NLSY79
data, I tested the prediction of the model by regressing the measure of job mobility
and productivity revealing activities on the measure of ability separately for high
school graduates and college graduates. Overall, the data precisely confirm the
predictions of the model.
The model and the supporting empirical evidence highlight the importance of
the function of higher education in understanding the subsequent careers of high
school and college graduates. Thus, the traditional signaling model and the em-
ployer learning literature that categorize young workers into two groups—high
school and college graduates—are misleading since the employers will more closely
observe heterogeneity among college graduates. I believe that acknowledging the
productivity revealing function of higher education will improve the traditional
signaling theory, giving it richer empirical implications.
Moreover, this analysis demonstrates the importance of the productivity reveal-
ing activities of workers which have been ignored in previous literature. The previ-
ous literature assumed that workers’ productivity revealing activities ended when
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the workers finished schooling.11 Thus training—regardless of the its type—has
been mostly analyzed under the human capital framework. Furthermore, job mo-
bility of workers was analyzed under the search theory framework that empha-
sized the limited ability of workers to evaluate the employers. Contrary to the
previous literature, this paper views the incidence of off-the-job training and the
job mobility of young workers as a result of productivity revealing activities. This
study also supports this view by verifying that productivity revealing activities
will more likely to be undertaken by the group of workers whose benefit from the
activity is larger than that of their counterparts.
Lastly, the different degree of asymmetric information across high school and
college graduates has implications for the wage distribution. For instance, under
the assumption of assortative matching, increases in heterogeneity across colleges
in terms of student ability will not only increase the inequality among college grad-
uates (Hoxby & Long, 1999) but will also increase the mean wage difference be-
tween college and high school graduate workers (Maskin & Kremer, 1996). That
is, as the employers can observe the individual abilities of college graduates more
closely, the assortative matching between college graduates and employers will
prevail, and both spread and mean wage of college workers will increase compared
to the wages of high school graduates.
11Lemieux, MacLeod & Parent (2009) is a notable exception
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
High School College Total
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
AFQT 0.2303 0.7761 1.2391 0.4569 0.4753 0.8329
Number of jobs per year 2.2212 0.9003 2.2025 0.7362 2.2167 0.8641
Log of real wage 6.4233 0.4856 6.8430 0.5913 6.5227 0.5428
Potential experience 6.4272 3.2861 5.6792 3.3683 6.2495 3.3210
% Performance pay 23.21 42.64 29.69
Training (%) 9.42 16.94 11.21
% On the job training 34.12 61.11 43.81
% apprenticeship 10.65 0.51 7.01
% Off the job training 55.23 38.38 49.18
Region(%)
Northeast 19.25 25.82 20.8
North Central 36.73 30.79 35.32
South 27.66 28.06 27.75
West 16.36 15.32 16.12
Urban residence(%) 70.89 86.73 74.60
Observations 11258 3507 14765
# of individuals 1815 569 2384
Average and standard deviations are calculated over individual by year observation coming from a panel
from 1979-2006.
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Table 3.2: Replicating ABH (2010)
Test : College=HS
High School College P-value
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AFQT 0.0844*** 0.00789 0.00202 0.162*** 0.128*** 0.118*** 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.00624) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0204) (0.0386) (0.0390)
Exper 0.102*** 0.0920*** 0.0961*** 0.102*** 0.0941*** 0.0859** 0.801 0.586 0.683
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0327) (0.0333) (0.0337)
AFQT*Exper/10 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.0617 0.0738 0.338 0.442
(0.0180) (0.0182) (0.0588) (0.0587)
Observations 10,280 10,280 9,984 3,279 3,279 3,140
R_sq 0.112 0.116 0.128 0.132 0.132 0.144
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
All specification includes year fixed effect and a cubic in potential experience. Specification (3) and (6) additionally controls for region of
region and urban residence. In column (7), I report the p-values for the difference in the coefficients of specifications (1) and (3). Similarly,
specification (8) and (9) compares (2) and (4) and (3) and (6) respectively. The White/Huber standard errors in parenthesis control for
correlation at the individual level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 3.3: Number of Jobs
Test : College=HS
High School College P-value
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AFQT 0.0389*** 0.126*** 0.126*** -0.0738** -0.0970 -0.0971 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.0110) (0.0255) (0.0257) (0.0295) (0.0699) (0.0710)
Exper -0.0643** -0.0528* -0.0453 0.106** 0.100** 0.0875* 0.014 0.024 0.030
(0.0310) (0.0311) (0.0315) (0.0439) (0.0473) (0.0483)
AFQT*Exper/10 -0.137*** -0.135*** 0.0420 0.0301 0.053 0.139
(0.0327) (0.0328) (0.0942) (0.0950)
Observations 10,559 10,559 10,254 3,386 3,386 3,238
R_sq 0.029 0.031 0.035 0.082 0.082 0.082
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
All specification includes year fixed effect and a cubic in potential experience. Specification (3) and (6) additionally controls for region of
region and urban residence. In column (7), I report the p-values for the difference in the coefficients of specifications (1) and (3). Similarly,
specification (8) and (9) compares (2) and (4) and (3) and (6) respectively. The White/Huber standard errors in parenthesis control for
correlation at the individual level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 3.4: Off-the-Job Training
Test : College=HS
High School College P-value
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AFQT 0.0111*** 0.0255*** 0.0238*** -0.000465 -0.0291* -0.0287 0.255 0.002 0.003
(0.00268) (0.00601) (0.00603) (0.00928) (0.0172) (0.0177)
Exper -0.0253*** -0.0234*** -0.0223*** 0.0150 0.00768 0.00817 0.008 0.054 0.068
(0.00771) (0.00767) (0.00774) (0.0116) (0.0125) (0.0127)
AFQT*Exper/10 -0.0227*** -0.0216** 0.0518* 0.0518* 0.006 0.008
(0.00866) (0.00867) (0.0274) (0.0280)
Observations 10,559 10,559 10,254 3,386 3,386 3,238
R_sq 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.022 0.023 0.025
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
All specification includes year fixed effect and a cubic in potential experience. Specification (3) and (6) additionally controls for region of
region and urban residence. In column (7), I report the p-values for the difference in the coefficients of specifications (1) and (3). Similarly,
specification (8) and (9) compares (2) and (4) and (3) and (6) respectively. The White/Huber standard errors in parenthesis control for
correlation at the individual level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 3.5: Performance Pay Jobs
Test : College=HS
High School College P-value
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AFQT 0.0335*** 0.105** 0.102** -0.0503 -0.154** -0.149** 0.014 0.004 0.004
(0.0109) (0.0505) (0.0508) (0.0326) (0.0720) (0.0726)
Exper 0.00888 -0.00428 -0.000391 0.237*** 0.219*** 0.223*** 0.020 0.025 0.038
(0.0728) (0.0736) (0.0741) (0.0633) (0.0646) (0.0655)
AFQT*Exper/10 -0.0785 -0.0768 0.164 0.166 0.047 0.030
(0.0545) (0.0547) (0.103) (0.103)
Observations 2145 2145 2,128 1093 1,093 1,076
R_sq .009 0.010 0.014 0.019 0.022 0.031
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
All specification includes year fixed effect and a cubic in potential experience. Specification (3) and (6) additionally controls for
region of region and urban residence. In column (7), I report the p-values for the difference in the coefficients of specifications (1)
and (3). Similarly, specification (8) and (9) compares (2) and (4) and (3) and (6) respectively. The White/Huber standard errors in
parenthesis control for correlation at the individual level.
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the Two Stage Model
Figure 3.2: Illustration of Wage Dynamics among High School Graduates
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of Wage Dynamics among College Graduates
Figure 3.4: Illustration of Post-Schooling Productivity Activity for High School
Graduates
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of Post-Schooling Productivity Activity for College Gradu-
ates
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